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The Dutch understanding of posting of workers in the context of free services 
provision and enlargement: A neutral approach?
Mijke Houwerzijl 1
I. Introduction
This papers consists of an overview and analysis of the Dutch legal and practical
approach towards posting of workers in the framework of the free provision of 
services within the European Union. As a point of departure, the ‘state of the 
art’ before the adoption of the Posting of Workers Directive (hereinafter 
PWD) is sketched (section II). This is indispensable for putting the Dutch 
approach towards the implementation, application and enforcement of the 
PWD in the right perspective. Next, an account of the Dutch implementation 
process of the PWD is given, including measures aimed at the effectiveness of 
the PWD in practice (on compliance, the provision and cooperation on 
information) (section III). The main legal and practical changes in (the context 
of) this implementation Act, resulting from the political debates on the 
consequences of the enlargement of the EU and on the draft services directive, 
are the subject of section IV. Finally, the Dutch reception of the ECJ case law 
often referred to as the ‘Laval-quartet’, is described (section V). Since this 
paper is meant for comparative purposes, it is less interesting to describe in 
full detail the actual Dutch legal rules on posting of workers, than to examine 
the choices and changes in (the application of) Dutch law. Nevertheless, a 
certain amount of details is unavoidable in the exercise to provide an accurate 
picture of the Dutch system. Section VI contains some concluding remarks.
II. Posting of workers in the Netherlands prior to the adoptation and 
implementation of the PWD
2.1 Awareness of the posting ‘phenomenon’
As we may gather from early ECJ-judgments in the cases Manpower (35/70) and Van 
der Vecht (19/67), posting was in the Netherlands already a phenomenon in the 
1960s and 1970s. Practices to hire a (temporary agency) worker from a country with a
1 Associate Professor at the Department of Labour Law and Social Security Law, Faculty of Law, 
Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands.. This contribution builds on and draws from earlier 
publications, see: Mijke Houwerzijl, Implementation of the Posting Directive in the Netherlands. In: 
Roger Blanpain (Ed.), FREEDOM OF SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, Labour and Social 
Security Law: the Bolkestein Initiative, Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations -  58, 2006, Part II, 
Applicable law, nr. 18, p. 225-234; Houwerzijl, M.S. , De Detacheringsrichtlijn. Over de achtergrond, 
inhoud en implementatie van richtlijn 96/71/EG. (PhD-thesis University of Tilburg 2005);,country 
report on the Dutch implementation, published in: Jan Cremers, Peter Donders (Ed.), The free 
movement o f  workers in the European Union, CLR Studies 4, Brussels: Reed Business Information, 
2004, p. 105 - 114.
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‘cheaper’ social security scheme only with the purpose of posting him to a Member 
State with a more expensive social security regime, were at that time labelled as 
abusive and as ‘social dumping’. The Dutch authorities responsible for the application 
and enforcement of social security developed policy rules against these kind of 
practices and were very keen on acquiring political support for strict rules on 
monitoring and compliance in the context of Regulation 1408/71 (now Regulation 
883/2004) and especially the so-called E-101 declarations. Until the beginning of the 
1990s, the sparse Dutch academic literature on posting of workers was purely focused 
on the social security aspects of posting of workers.
Around 1990, Jacobs was the first author in the Netherlands who drew attention to 
labour law aspects of the ‘completion of the single market’ in 1992. Among other 
things he pointed to the upcoming phenomenon of posting of workers in the European 
construction sector as a result of the gradual liberalisation of the EU public 
procurement market from the mid 1980s on. In the slipstream of this development, 
isles of foreign labour law were observed at big construction sites as a consequence of 
chains of cross-border subcontracting.3 The proposal for a Posting of Workers 
Directive and the underlying question to what extent Member States must be allowed 
(as a consequence of the Rome Convention 1980, together with the VanderElst and 
Rush Portuguesa judgments of the ECJ) or should be required to apply their 
mandatory wages and other working conditions to workers posted on their territory, 
didn’t lead to fierce debates in the Netherlands at the time, not in academic literature, 
nor in circles of policy makers.
This was only slightly different in the construction sector, where the Dutch trade 
union ‘FNV Bouw & Hout bond’ tried to raise some awareness to the social dumping 
problems surrounding big building projects in a cross-border context. At that time, the 
general secretary of the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers 
(EFBWW) originated from this Dutch trade union. On behalf of the EFBWW he 
pleaded for a solution in community law analogous to the ILO Convention 94 on 
social clauses in public procurement contracts. In this respect the American Davis­
Bacon Act was a source of inspiration as well.4 During the adoption process of the 
PWD, the EFBWW pleaded for an application of host state labour standards without a 
threshold (so from day 1 of the posting).5 Although the Dutch FNV Bouw & Hout 
supported this stance, it did not put it on the domestic agenda as a very pressing issue 
because in practice social dumping was not much of a problem, even in the Dutch 
construction industry. This may be attributed to the closed structure of this branch 
until 2001, thanks to the predominant cooperation of Dutch building companies in
2 See Jacobs and Van Rooij Bouwrecht 1992; A. T.J.M. Jacobs, De arbeidsrechtelijke aspecten van de 
voltooiing van de Europese binnenmarkt, NJB 1989.
3 Until 1992 less than 5 % of building activities in the EU took was carried out across borders.
4 Indeed in the action programme linked to the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for 
Workers signed on 9 December 1989, next to the proposal which led to the PWD another proposal was 
launched to combat social dumping, in particular in the construction industry. This was a:
“Proposal for a Community instrument on the introduction of a labour clause into public contracts”, 
with a reference to Communication COM 89/400.”
5 See J. Cremers, ‘Denkend aan Europa. AVV in Europees perspectief’, Zeggenschap 1993/7 and B. 
Koebele and J. Cremers, European Union: posting of workers in the construction industry, 1994. See 
for his -  short - own account o f this period, Cremers, Dolvik, Bosch, Posting of workers in the single 
market: attempts to prevent social dumping and regime competition in the EU, Industrial Relations 
Journal, 2007. See also J. Hellsten, On the Social Dimension in Posting of Workers, Helsinki, 2005.
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cartels.6 Trade Unions indirectly profited from this cartel-mentality as well, because it 
(almost) eliminated labour cost competition and benefited the level of compliance to 
the CLA for the construction industry.
2.2 The PIL approach to cross-border mobility of workers
Right from the beginning of the rather modest debate in the Netherlands, the quest for 
the right mix of labour standards applicable to posted workers was understood as a 
problem regarding the interface between private international law (hereinafter PIL or 
conflicts of law) and national labour law.
Prior to the adoptation and implementation of the PWD the law applicable to the 
individual employment contract of posted workers (to and from the Netherlands) was 
exclusively governed by national PIL and later on by the Rome Convention of 1980 
(entered into force in the Netherlands in 1991). With the help of these Law of 
Conflict rules the law applicable to the individual employment contract of the (posted) 
worker has to be determined. Since in the Netherlands CLA-provisions are a source of 
law for most individual employment contracts, they also fall (through this linkage) 
into the scope of the law of conflict rules.
Most provisions of the Rome Convention embody the principle of (individual) party 
autonomy and the principle of legal certainty. The rules applicable to contractual 
obligations are in principle neutral to the sort of social-economic interests furthered 
by (labour) law, since they are based on the assumption that national legal systems are 
interchangeable. However, for obligations deriving from the employment (and 
consumer) relationship the rules of conflict have partly broken with the presumptions 
of free choice of law and neutrality in order to protect the, from a social-economic 
point of view, weaker pary in the contractual relationship. The rule is that parties are 
free to chose the law applicable to their employment contract, only insofar as it is 
more favourable to the employee than the mandatory standards of the law which 
would objectively apply to the contract in absence of a choice by the parties. In this 
respect, Art. 6(2a)8 of the Rome Convention (and now, Art. 8(2) of the Rome I 
Convention) refers to the law of the country where9 the contract is habitually 
performed, even if the employee is temporarily employed in another country.
According to the so-called Guliano/Lagarde-report10 this means that:
6 Still in 1995 more than 80 % of public procurement was awarded in closed tender procedures, 
whereas in Belgium this was approximately 50%. Nevertheless, Belgian building companies quintupled 
their turnover on the Dutch construction market between 1983 and 1996. See also B. Bercusson, 
European Labour Law 1996, p. 500 on the increasing turnover of big British construction firms on ‘the 
Continent’ , while their share in the homemarket diminished. See Houwerzijl, dissertation 2005, p. 280­
284 for more details on the Dutch construction sector. Also D. Corbey, Samenwerking met buitenland 
noodzakelijk, Stuwing nr. 3, B&Hbond FNV 1997, p. 6.
7 Described in Van Hoek, 2000, Van Lent, 2000; Polak 1988; Dumortier 1981. See Houwerzijl, 
Dissertation 2005, p. 6-7.
8 We refrain here from the other connecting factors stated in Art. 6(2), namely ‘the law of the country 
in which the company that employed the worker has its place of business’ or ‘the law of the country 
with which the employment contract is most closely associated’.
9 in Art. 8(2) of the Rome I Convention: the words ‘or failing that, from which the employee habitually 
carries out his work in performance o f the contract’ are added.
10 Containing the ‘explanatory memorandum’ o f the Rome Convention, see EC Official Journal, C 282, 
31/10/1980 p. 0001 -  0050.
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‘The mandatory rules from which the parties may not derogate consist not only of the 
provisions relating to the contract of employment itself, but also provisions such as those 
concerning industrial safety and hygiene which are regarded in certain Member States as 
being provisions of public law.
It follows from this text that if the law of the country designated by Article 6 (2) makes the 
collective employment agreements binding for the employer, the employee will not be 
deprived of the protection afforded to him by these collective employment agreements by the 
choice of law of another State in the individual employment contract. ’
This explanation suits the traditional Dutch PIL- approach in cases concerning 
employment contracts, since in Dutch labour law the individual autonomy of the 
parties is limited by the mandatory character of much labour law among which 
extended CLA-provisions. Dutch labour law has often been characterized as being of 
a corporatist nature, due to the fact that social partners in interplay with the state play 
an important role in regulating the Dutch industrial relations. Within domestic labour 
law, the party autonomy can not only be restricted in order to protect employees, but 
it can also be set aside in order to steer the labour market for social-political 
purposes.11
The application of Art. 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention leads to territorial application 
of labour law in the archetypal case of workers mobility, namely when a worker 
moves to another country and concludes and performs an employment contract 
overthere. It may lead to a gap in protection however, in more complex forms of 
workers mobility, for instance in the case of posting. In that situation a worker has 
concluded his employment contract in the country where he (is supposed to) work(s) 
habitually, but temporarily performs his duties in another country. Then the law of the 
habitual place of work prevails, irrespective of mandatory labour standards in the law 
of the host country that would protect the worker better.
However, Article 7 (now Art. 9 Rome I Convention) defines rules of a special 
mandatory character; these rules may apply even if a worker is only temporarily 
working in a country. The text of this provision was in particular inspired by the 1966 
judgment of the Netherlands Supreme Court in the so-called Alnati case, in which the 
Court said that, ‘although the law applicable to contracts of an international character 
can, as a matter of principle, only be that which the parties themselves have chosen,
"it may be that, for a foreign State, the observance of certain of its rules, (..) is of such 
importance that the courts must take account of them, and hence apply them in 
preference to the law of another State which may have been chosen by the parties to 
govern their contract".’12
In the Netherlands a clear distinction exists between public law rules on labour 
protection ((representing supra-individual interests, such as the regulation of the 
domestic labour market, and/or the protection of workers e.g. in the area of safety and
11 See for instance Windmuller 1987, Hemerijck, A. C. and Visser, J. (2000). A Dutch Miracle. Job 
growth, welfare reform and corporatism in the Netherlands. Nagelkerke, A.G., & Wilthagen, T. (2002). 
Een nieuwe mozaiek van arbeidsverhoudingen? In A.G. Nagelkerke & T. Wilthagen (Eds.), 
Arbeidsverhoudingen in Ontwikkeling; Eenheid en Verscheidenheid van Sectoren (pp. 152-163). 
Kluwer: Deventer. For a very brief sketch of the Dutch ‘poldermodel’ of industrial relations see also 
Hepple/Veneziani (Ed.), The Transformation o f Labour Law in Europe, Hart Publishing 2009, p. 321.
12 Citation taken from Guliano and Lagarde report.
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health) and the private law rules (representing the legitimate expectations of the 
contractual parties) on the employment contract. Thus, if an employment contract is 
governed by foreign law, Dutch mandatory provisions will only apply to the contract 
if these provisions can be classified as overriding mandatory provisions in the 
meaning of Article 7 Rome Convention/ Art. 9 of the Rome I Regulation. Most labour 
protection rules of a public nature will have this character, most contractual rules will 
not. Of the private law category, only specific rules will be overriding mandatory 
provisions because they are deemed to protect a public or supra-individual interest. 
Since Dutch CLA-provisions are a source of law for most individual employment 
contracts, they fall into the scope of the law of conflict rules. Extended provisions of
13CLAs may also be labelled as such, but according to academic literature and to a 
report of the Social Economic Council in 1992 on the implications of the coming into 
effect of the Rome I Convention this must be assessed for each provision, depending 
on the nature and purposes of it. Thus, in contrast with traditions in France, Belgium 
and Luxembourg, not all but only some provisions of extended CLAs may be 
classified as rules of an overriding mandatory nature.
Although the Rome Convention14 provided for fairly uniform15 law of conflict rules 
in the Member States, until 2004 the Convention could only be interpreted exclusively 
by national courts. The European Court of Justice did not have any jurisdiction with 
respect to the Rome Convention.16 Therefore, in the Netherlands and in other Member 
States national PIL-traditions still give their flavour to the application of the 
Convention in the Member States. This was furthered by the fact that the Convention 
does not define the term ‘mandatory rule’ clearly. The margin for a national 
appreciation of what should be treated as a mandatory rule and what not, was used by 
the MS to continue their different traditions in particular with regard to the extent to 
which and the reason why the applicable employment law is set aside by overriding 
mandatory rules and rules of public policy.17
2.3 The overall picture prior to the PWD
As explained above, the traditional Dutch PIL-approach to what constitutes a rule of 
an overriding mandatory character steers a middle-course. For a posted worker on the 
territory of the Netherlands before the implementation of the PWD, this meant that 
not all, but only some provisions of extended CLAs could be applied to him, namely 
when these provisions due to their nature and purpose should be classified as rules of 
an overriding mandatory character. However, this was only a possibility and not a 
duty and therefore it was left to the social partners to decide on this matter for
13 See for instance A.A.H. Van Hoek, Internationale mobiliteit van werknemers, PhD-thesis 2000, p. 
391.
14 Since 17 December 2009 replaced by the Rome I Regulation (593/2008) for newly concluded 
(employment) contracts.
15 Not fully, since some MS made a reservation to art. 7(1) of the Rome Convention, which means that 
MS may give different effect to internationally mandatory rules not belonging to the law of the judge 
(lex fori).
16 First judgment o f the ECJ on a (non-labour law) Rome Convention case was in 2009 (Intercontainer 
Interfrigo (C-133/08).
17 See extensively the dissertation of A.A.H. van Hoek, Internationale mobiliteit van werknemers, SDU 
2000.
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themselves. Like many other extended Dutch CLAs do uptil today, until 1995 the 
Dutch CLA for the construction sector excluded posted workers from its personal 
scope. Although already on the bargaining agenda of the union side from 1990 on, as 
a consequence of the Rush Portuguesa judgment, this was only altered five years later 
following the example of Belgium.19 In fact, this is all that can be said about the 
reception of the Rush Portuguesa judgment in Dutch labour law with regard to the 
application of host state labour law. The Dutch academic literature didn’t pay any
attention to it, apart from an interesting annotation of the Belgian author Verschueren
20in a Dutch migration law journal. Verschueren noticed the broad interpretation that 
the ECJ gave, albeit implicitly, in point 18 of this judgment to Art. 7 of the Rome I 
Convention. In sharp contrast to other ‘high wage’ countries such as Belgium, 
Germany, Austria, Finland and Denmark, in the Netherlands no need was felt to 
require that all or a part of its employment regulations and (extended) collective 
agreements would be applicable to posted workers on its territory.
18
III. Implementation of the PWD
3.1 Parliamentary history
The Posting of Workers Directive was officially implemented by means of the Wet 
arbeidsvoorwaarden grensoverschrijdende arbeid  (Terms of Employment (Cross­
Border Work) Act). The Act entered into force on 24 December 1999. The 
parliamentary history of the Act perfectly illustrates the ‘neutral’ attitude of the Dutch 
government vis-à-vis the Posting of Workers Directive (hereinafter PWD). In brief: 
the Bill was sent to the House of Representatives in Spring 1999. In the parliamentary 
debate, the central motto of the government became clear: ‘We do not want to 
transpose more or less than necessary.’ In hindsight, it seems that the Dutch 
government advocated the implementation of the PWD as ‘a maximum Directive’. 
Since the ‘ ECJ judgments in the Laval-quartet’, we may appreciate this as an 
anticipatory plan.
The main consequence of this plan was that none of the optional provisions in article 
3 (i.e. Art. 3(3-5), Art. 3(10) of the PWD were considered in the Bill. This neutral 
attitude corresponds with the general Dutch conduct concerning the implementation 
of EU-Directives. Nevertheless, the majority of the House of Representatives did not 
agree with this strategy. These politicians objected in particular to the limitation of the 
collective agreement part of the Directive to the construction sector. They stated that 
companies in other sectors would also want equal treatment at this point. The system 
of universally applicable (generally binding) collective agreements is widely spread in 
the Netherlands. Thus, not broadening the scope of the Bill through Article 3(10) of 
the Directive would mean that Dutch companies and workers outside the construction 
sector would not be able to compete with their foreign colleagues on an equal footing.
18 In my opinion this runs contrary to the Dutch implementation of Art. 3(1) of the PWD which states 
that the Member States should ensure the core protection of the posted workers. Although the PWD 
limited this for extended CLA-provisions to the construction industry, since 2005 the Dutch 
implementation Act has broadened this to extended CLA-provisions in all branches.
19 See Jacobs/Van Rooij, BR 1992/2, p. 133 and Houwerzijl, Detacheringsrichtlijn, p. 281.
20 See Verschueren, ‘Het arrest Rush Portuguesa, een nieuwe wending aan het vrije verkeer van 
werknemers in het Europese gemeenschapsrecht, MR 1990/10.
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This discussion dominated the parliamentary debate about the Bill, but did not lead to 
its amendment. Finally, the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament agreed with the 
Bill, under the condition that the Government would seek advice of the national board 
for socio-economic affairs (SER)21 in which social partners are predominantly 
represented but also, for one-third, a delegation of ‘independent experts’.22 Thus, the 
Bill was passed on. Meanwhile, the SER delegated the request to another board of 
advice, named STAR,23 which only exists of representatives from employers 
associations and unions. This board advised divided about the desirability of scope 
broadening to other sectors: Union representatives were in favour of it, whereas 
representatives on the employer side spoke out against it.24 In January 2001 the 
Government concluded that the Advise did not give cause to adjust its policy. This 
conclusion was accepted by Parliament and the discussion seemed to be closed.
Obviously, other items were raised during the parliamentary debate about the Terms 
of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act. Questions were posed about the 
definition of ‘posting’, about the mode of compliance and enforcement of the 
applicable employment conditions for posted workers (Art. 4, 5, 6), about the non-use 
of the derogation option for postings not exceeding one month (Art. 3 (3 and 4), or 
'non-significant' postings (Art. 3 (5) and about the application of the ‘favour- 
principle’ (Art. 3(7).25 However, none of these questions led to broad discussions or 
to any adjustment of the Bill. As far as the answers to these questions are still of 
relevance, they are dealt with in the sections underneath.
3.2 Definition of posting, worker and period of work
In the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act (Art. 1) the posted worker is 
defined as someone who works temporarily in the Netherlands and on whose 
employment contract foreign law is applicable. No other words are used to implement 
Article 1 and Article 2 of the PWD.
3.2.1 Definition o f  posting
Hence, the three types of posting that are distinguished in Art. 1(3) of the PWD do not 
occur in the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act. Still, as the 
responsible Minister assured members of Parliament, the Act is meant to apply for all 
three types of posting. Explicit implementation in the Act was not deemed necessary. 
Problem in practice with this ‘implicit’ method of implementation is that the posting 
definition of Art.1 (3) does not correspond to the Dutch internal definition of 
posting.26 In Dutch (legal) usage only posting types b (intra-corporate posting in 
multinational companies) and c (posting through temporary work agencies) are 
understood as posting, while type a (temporary cross-border working in the
27framework of the employer’s subcontract) is normally seen as something different.
21 Sociaal-Economische Raad.
22 See Handelingen II, 199S-1999, nr. 1G4, p. 59S5 en Kamerstukken II, 199S-1999, 26 524, nr. 1G-11.
23 Stichting van de Arbeid.
24 See STAR, Advies inzake de uitvoering van richtlijn 96/71/EG, 4 oktober 2GGG, no. 11/GG.
25 See ‘Kamerstukken II, 199S-1999, 26 524, nr. 5-6, Handelingen II, 199S-1999, nr. 1G4, p.59S5.’
26 See ‘Kamerstukken II, 199S-1999, 26 524, nr. 5, p. 3 and nr. 6, p. 3 ’.
27 A judgment of kantonrechter Heerlen, 24 sept. 2GG3 (JAR 26S/2GG3) shows that this confusion has ij 
fact occurred in practice. See annotation M.S. Houwerzijl, AI 2GG4/2, p. 39-41.
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Moreover, the definition in the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act
28may be confusing because it includes (probably unintentionally) more workers than 
only temporary service workers who usually work in another Member State: It also 
includes workers who carry out their work in other Member States permanently on a 
temporary basis. In such a situation no Member State can be seen as the habitual work 
place of a worker. Examples are international truck drivers and tour guides. Because 
art. 1(1) Directive 96/71 is not explicitly transposed, the Terms of Employment 
(Cross-Border Worker) Act is not limited to companies that post workers in the 
framework of a provision of services. This means, at least in theory, that it would be 
possible to bring under the scope of the WAGA someone who has a temporary job in 
the Netherlands under an employment contract in which parties have explicitly chosen 
to apply foreign law (art. 8 Rome I Regulation). Because art. 1(1) Directive 96/71 is 
not explicitly transposed; the WAGA is not limited to companies that post workers in 
the framework of a provision of services.29
In contrast, it can be deduced from a jointly-published leaflet of 2003 in the 
construction industry that social partners, while not mentioning the three types either, 
at least limited the scope of the applicable provisions of their collective agreements to
30workers who ‘normally work for their employer in another country of the EU’.
Since 2003, a provision in the extended collective agreement for the Construction 
sector31 repeats the definition of the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) 
Act, but in addition stresses that a ‘posted worker’ means in this respect every worker 
who usually works in another Member State, not being the Netherlands. Thus, the 
provision of the social partners is more accurate than the definition in the Terms of 
Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act, although here the necessity of posting in the 
framework of a cross-border provision of services (as mentioned in Art. 1 of the 
Posting Directive) is absent as well. This seems to imply that the linkage between 
posting of workers and cross-border service provision was overlooked by the 
implementing actors.
3.2.2 Status o f  a worker
Art. 1 of the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act makes no explicit 
distinction between a posted worker and a (posted) self-employed worker. But 
Parliamentary documents and the applicable legislation for posted workers under 
Dutch law show that only the Dutch definition of an employee is to be taken into
32account in case a question should arise about the status of the worker. In this respect
28 Since no consciousness of the difference with the PWD definition is shown in the parliamentary 
documents.
29 See Bloemaarts, SR mei 2004.
30 See Brochure ‘Posting to the Dutch construction sector. Collective labour agreement for the 
Construction Sector, Collective labour agreement for Site Management, Technical and Administrative 
personnel in construction companies,’ September 2003, published on behalf of the parties to these 
collective agreements, especially p. 2/3. In an update of 2008 however, this text was deleted but instead 
the different types of posting were described.
31 See Article 92 of the extended version of the collective agreement for the construction (Bouwcao 
2007-2009).
32 See Art. 1:1 Arbeidstijdenwet, art. 1 Arbeidsomstandighedenwet 1998 and art. 4 jo. art. 2 WMM for 
a definition of an employee under Dutch law. It would have been more clear if art. 610 , 610 a and b 
BW and also 690 of book 7 BW had been mentioned in art 1 of the Terms o f Employment (Cross­
Border Worker) Act. About the last mentioned provision the Explanatory Memorandum makes clear
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no problems have arisen like the ones that led to ECJ judgments in cases like Barry
33Banks / Fitzwilliams in the framework of Vo. 1408/71. Still, the practical problem 
underneath is not easy to tackle: Although certain branches prefer to work with self­
employed workers who would surely be unveiled as employees if all facts were 
known, in practice it is very difficult to prove this. How does one recognise a posted 
worker and as a result apply the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act? 
First of all these workers are difficult to find because they often work quite insulated 
from the Dutch workers. 34 And when they would be found, language problems and a 
lack of interest occur, because (most of the) posted workers have nothing to gain with 
a judicial procedure about their status.
3.2.3 Posted workers from third countries
The scope of the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act is not limited to 
workers originating from one of the EU Member States. This means that posted 
workers from a ‘third country’ are entitled (at least) to the same protection and their 
employers are obliged (at least) to comply with the same conditions as workers and 
employers from within the EU. Migrant law however, shows that posting by an 
undertaking established in a third country is regulated differently: The Foreign 
Nationals Employment Act requires not only a residence permit for workers from a
35third country but also requires employers to obtain a work permit. Furthermore, the 
employer is obliged to treat and pay the foreign worker in conformity with all Dutch 
current working and employment conditions. 6
On the level of the extended provisions of the CLA for the Dutch construction 
industry, this full equal treatment of posted workers from third countries used to be 
stipulated as well. Until 2007, it was stated in Art. 1a (b) of the CLA that all its 
extended provisions are applicable to posted workers from third countries. In the last 
decade a growing number of undertakings especially from (former candidate-) 
Member States like Poland is active in the Dutch construction sector (and in some 
other industries like horticulture and cleaning). In practice a lot of workers from these 
countries are directly deployed through Dutch temporary employment agencies. In
that this also applies to posted temporary workers from abroad. See Kamerstukken II, 1998-99, 26 524, 
nr. 3, p. 3.
33 See ECJ judgments in cases nr. C 178/97 from 30 March 2000 (Banks) and nr. C-202/97 from 
February 2000 (Fitzwilliam). Problem for host countries is that Reg 1408/71 and its successor Reg 
883/2004 refer to the law of the country of origin (sending country) to define the status o f the worker.
34 Especially in the construction sector. A practical reason for this ‘insulation’ is that working together 
in a team with different nationalities would lead to much more communication problems for the 
managers of the teams on a building site.
35 Until December 2005, no difference in treatment was made between third country workers legally 
resident in one of the Member States and posted by an ‘EU-employer’ , and third country workers who 
live outside the EU and who are posted by an employer, established in a third country. As a 
consequence of the judgment of the ECJ in Case C-445/03 (Commission v Luxembourg) of 21 October
2004, the Dutch government announced that in the near future no work permit will be required 
anymore for the first group.
36 ‘In conformity with Dutch current working conditions’ (marktconform) means that not only statutory 
provisions but also working conditions in current collective agreements (extended and not extended 
ones) have to be applied or even more favourable company-related working conditions. Only in 
situations when the foreign TCN worker is hired for a very short period (a couple of days or at least 
less than a month), it might in some cases be allowed that the worker is paid according to the statutory 
minimum wage level (Art. 8 (d) WAV).
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that case all Dutch labour law is applicable to them as well. But as a posted worker 
from an EU Member State, they are entitled to the hard core only.
3.2.4 What is temporary?
Finally, in the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act the ‘allowed’ length 
of posting is not determined. This vagueness about the period of posting is rather 
logical: In the PWD it was not specified either. It would have been a breach of the 
‘neutral implementation attitude’ to develop a Dutch policy on this point, even if we 
refrain from the question whether the Directive would permit a national determination 
of the period of posting at all. Nevertheless, in the CLA for the Dutch construction 
industry the traditional approach can still be traced in provisions on the posting of 
workers from the Netherlands to other Member States (usually neighbouring countries 
Germany and Belgium). Here it is stated that the performance of the contract in the 
other Member State is regarded as posting, for as long as Dutch social security 
legislation applies to the employment contract (this is possible for a maximum of 2 
years, according to art. 12 Reg 883/2004).
3.3 Terms and conditions of employment in law
3.3.1 Statutory terms and conditions for posted workers
Interestingly, applicable national rules corresponding to the subject matter covered by 
Art. 3(1) of the PWD are only partly identified by the Terms of Employment (Cross­
Border Worker) Act. Art. 1 of the Act makes sure that a couple of provisions in Book 
7 (about employment contracts) of the Civil Code are applicable to posted workers in 
the Netherlands. Herewith (all) mandatory civil law provisions about minimum paid 
annual holidays, equal treatment of men and women and other provisions on non­
discrimination, health and safety at work (employers’ liability in case of work related 
accidents or diseases) and one of the protective measures for pregnant women 
(prohibition to dismiss someone because of pregnancy) are implemented. Although 
not clear when one only reads the text of the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border 
Worker) Act, several provisions of Dutch public (administrative) law are applicable to 
posted workers as well. All special mandatory law with a ‘public order’ character is 
deemed applicable under art.7 of the Rome I Convention (art. 9 of the Rome I 
regulation). This concerns provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, the Working Time 
Act, the Health and Safety Act, the Temporary Employment Agencies Act and the 
Equal Treatment Act.
The Dutch implementation of Article 3 of the PWD may be interpreted as a 
continuation of the traditional Dutch PIL-tradition, as explained above in section II:
As was explained in parliamentary documents, the Acts and legislative provisions that 
were already undisputedly deemed applicable under Art. 7 of the Rome I Convention, 
such as the safety and health act and the working time act, didn’t have to be 
mentioned in the Dutch implementation Act. Indeed, according to the Preamble of the 
PWD (Recital 7-11), the Directive makes the optional character of Article 7 Rome I 
Convention obligatory, and defines what subjects of employment law must be seen as 
‘special mandatory’.
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Thus, in the set of applicable mandatory national rules (as a minimum) corresponding 
with the subject matters in Art.3 (1) of the PWD, a mixture of public law and private 
law with an overriding mandatory character is visible:
a. With regard to maximum work periods and minimum rest periods, only the 
public Working Time Act (ATW) applies, is.
b. But minimum paid annual holidays are laid down in Art.634 t/m 642, 645 of 
Book 7 of the Civil Code (BW). The minimal payment of holiday allowance (which 
exists next to the right to continued payment of wages during holidays) is laid down 
in art.15 of the public Minimum Wages Act (WMM).
c. Likewise minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates, are also covered by 
the Minimum Wages Act (WMM), which stipulates a flat Minimum wage rate based 
on a fulltime working week. Lower rates of Minimum Wage are laid down for young 
workers (from the age of 15 - 22 years: Besluit Minimumjeugdloonregeling). 
According to the second sentence of Art. 3 (7) of the PWD it is possible to consider 
allowances specific to the posting to be part of the minimum wage, unless they are 
paid in reimbursement of expenditure actually incurred on account of the posting, 
such as expenditure on travel, board and lodging. The same rule is laid down in Art. 6 
lid 1 (sub f) Minimum Wage Act (WMM).
d. Conditions of hiring-out of workers, in particular the supply of workers by 
temporary employment undertakings, are laid down in the public Temporary 
Agencies Act (WAADI). Also applicable37 however is art. 7:690 of the Dutch Civil 
Code. This provision states that a contract for temporary work is an employment 
contract. Most important provision of the WAADI is Art. 8: Unless a (universally 
applicable) collective agreement provides other rules, temporary workers are entitled 
to the same wage and other allowances as comparable workers in the industry where 
the worker is temporarily carrying out his work (loonverhoudingsnorm). Furthermore, 
Art. 11 WAADI obliges the employer to give temporary workers all information about 
necessary vocational qualifications and working conditions, before the temporary 
work takes off.
e. Rules about health, safety and hygiene at work can be found in the public 
Working Conditions Act (Arbo-wet 1998) and, specifically for employment related 
diseases and accidents, in Art. 7:658 of the Civil Code (BW).
f. Protective measures with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of 
pregnant women, women who have recently given birth, children and young people 
are found in the following public laws: Working Time Act (ATW), Working 
Conditions Act (Arbowet 1998) and the Minimum Wages Act (WMM). For pregnant 
posted workers also Art.7: 670(2) of the Civil Code (BW) applies. But the usual 
sanction that accompanies this provision for workers under Dutch law is not 
applicable. Therefore it is unclear for the posted pregnant worker how she can 
actually enforce her right to protection against unlawful dismissal.
g. Equal treatment of men and women and other provisions on non­
discrimination are laid down in the public Equal Treatment Act (AWGB) and in Art. 
646, 647, 648 book 7 of the Civil Code (BW). Important is that posted workers are not 
treated unequal on grounds of nationality. Unequal treatment is only allowed when 
related to the specific employment situation that goes along with cross-border posting.
3.4. Terms and conditions of employment in (extended) collective agreements
37 Although only mentioned in the Ex. Mem., see above noot 15.
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3.4.1. System o f exension o f CLA’s
And what Dutch CLA-provisions may be applied to posted workers? As explained in 
section II above, Dutch legal doctrine classifies CLA-provisions as a source of law for 
the individual employment relationship. This is (1) the case when the employer is a 
party to the CLA or is a member of an employers association which is party to the 
CLA. Next to this (2) the CLA may be incorporated in the individual employment 
contract either implicitly or explicitl, by way of a contractual clause. Finally (3), the 
CLA-provisions must be applied by individual parties when they are declared 
generally binding. The Dutch method of extension of collective agreements came into 
force in 1937 and results in an ‘erga omnes’ scope during the period of extension. 
Therefore the system fits into the definition in the first subparagraph of Art. 3 (8) of 
the PWD: 'Collective agreements which have been declared universally applicable’ 
means collective agreements or arbitration awards which must be observed by all 
undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned.
In the Netherlands, CLA provisions can only be made when statutory provisions leave 
room for derogation. In most cases derogation from a legal provision is only possible 
for social partners. If a CLA provision proves to be inconsistent with (mandatory) 
legal provisions, this bargaining provision must be considered as null and void. For 
workers who are employed by a non-organised employer in the industry, only 
extended collective agreements are applicable.38 The method of extension of CLA’s 
results in an ‘erga omnes’ scope during the period of extension. During that period the 
CLA is ‘universally applicable’ which means that it must be observed by all 
undertakings in the industry concerned. In fact, it is not the CLA as a whole that is 
declared generally binding, but only separate provisions of the agreement. The Act 
excludes certain provisions form the possibility of extension, for example provisions 
which have the purpose to compel employers or workers to join an 
organization.Derogations from generally binding CLA-provisions by clauses in 
individual employment contracts are automatically null and void.
The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment has the competence to declare 
provisions of CLA’s generally binding. The Minister must publish the proposed 
extension, so that employers and workers and their organizations have an opportunity 
to submit objections before a decision is taken. Before CLA-provisions may be 
extended, two conditions must be fulfilled. In the first place there must be a request of 
at least one of the parties to the collective agreement. The second condition is, that the 
collective agreement must already be applicable to a majority of those working in the 
concerned branch of industry. According to the law, it must be ‘an important majority 
in the opinion of the Minister’. For a long time it was unclear what should be regarded 
as an ‘important majority’, but this was never considered to be a problem until 
neoliberal economists started to challenge the system of extension before in the early 
1990s. They reasoned that it constituted an unreasonable restriction to free
39competition. Since 1998 the Minister applies his competence to extend CLA- 
provisions according to published policy rules. In these rules it is stated that a
38 This is regulated in the Act of extension of provisions of collective agreements (Wet op het algemeen 
verbindend en het onverbindend verklaren van bepalingen van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten), Act 
of 25 May 1937, Government Gazette 801.
39 See E. Franssen and A.T.J.M. Jacobs in: Niklas Bruun & Jari Hellsten (eds.), Collective agreement 
and Competition in the EU, Uppsala 2001.
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majority of 60% is always ‘important’ and a majority of 55% or (or even less) may be 
considered important enough under certain conditions. A majority does not consist of 
the number of unionised employees (union density in the Netherlands is only around 
25 %), but of the number of workers in the service of organised employers. Since the 
employer, bound by a collective agreement, must apply its employment conditions to 
all of his employees40, irrespective of union or non-union membership, a majority is 
easily reached when enough (large) employers are bound by the collective agreement. 
This system, which depends on the density of organised employers instead of 
employees, makes nearly 85% of the employees in the Netherlands covered by 
CLA’s. According to research in the 1990s, this would still be over 75% without 
extension, due to the fact that so many large enterprises are organised.41
3.4.2 Extended CLA-provisions and posted workers
Art. 2(6) of the Act of Extension of Provisions of Collective Agreements transposes 
the hard core of labour standards, specified in art. 3(1) of the PWD. Subsequently,
Art. 2(7) limited the scope of Art. 2(6) to the branches of industry, mentioned in
42the Appendix of the PWD. Although in the PWD the construction industry is 
defined broader than usual in the Netherlands,43 the Dutch Government did not try to 
identify all the corresponding Dutch collective agreements. Some Members of 
Parliament insisted that the government should do so because it would further the 
accessibility of the Dutch collective agreements to foreign employers and employees 
and it would prevent misunderstandings as well. The responsible Minister objected, 
saying that such an exercise would lead to more bureaucracy and moreover, that it 
belonged to the competence of the social partners to decide on this issue.44 The same 
answer was given about the related issue of who has the competence to decide which 
provisions of the collective agreement correspond to the subject matter covered by the 
PWD.
As part of the collective bargaining process Dutch social partners in the construction 
sector began with classifying the applicable provisions in subsequent CLAs for the 
construction industry from 1998 on. Between 1998 and 2002 they had explored the 
possibilities and limitations of the four main CLAs in the construction sector. These 
collective agreements cover most but not all occupations and companies in the Dutch 
construction sector. Still not all sub-industries and professions were included that are 
part of the prescribed activities in the Appendix to the PWD. Professions such as 
painter, plasterer, installation engineer and electrician are subject to other CLAs. Only 
in 2003, the scope of the CLA for painters-firms (and related companies) was for the 
first time expanded to posted workers (Art. 2a). A supplement stipulates exactly
40 Article 14 of the Act on collective agreements. The parties to the collective agreement may deviate 
from this statutory provision.
41 See Schmale & Siebenga, SMA, However, many authors have observed that the coverage of CLAs 
would probably drop considerably if the extension mechanism were to be abolished, because this 
would expose the organised employers to wage competition from their unorganised competitors. See E. 
Franssen and A.T.J.M. Jacobs, o.c. 2001 and Van Peijpe in M. Ronmar< Kluwer Law international, 
2008.
42 Until the law was altered in 2005.
43 The exact scope can be found in the so-called NACE-codes 45.10 up to and including 45.45. See 
appendix Regulation (EEG) nr. 3037/90 of 9 October 1990 (OJ L 293 of 24.10.1990, p. 1), last change 
by Regulation (EG) nr. 29/2002 of 19.12.2001 (OJ L 6 of 10.1.2002, p. 3).
44 See Handelingen II, 1998-1999, nr. 104, p. 5989-90, Hand. II, 1999-2000, nr. 5, p. 231 and 
Kamerstukken II, 1998-99, 26 524, nr. 9.
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which provisions are belonging to the hard core of the PWD and therefore applicable 
to posted workers.45 From the slow progress that has been made in this field, it may 
be deduced that it has been quite difficult to motivate the bargaining social partners 
engaged in the other related construction CLAs 46 to make the inclusion of posted 
workers a part of the scope of their CLA. The consequence of this situation is that 
posted workers that should be covered by CLA’s where no reference is made to this, 
are left to take action themselves and that possibilities to undercut wages of domestic 
employees are taken for granted. Naturally, the chance that they are aware of the fact 
that for instance the CAO for plasterers is not applied to them although falling under 
the scope of the Appendix of the Directive, is very small. In this rather theoretical
47situation , the posted plasterer has to go to Court with this claim.
So, which applicable collective agreement provisions are identified in the Dutch 
CLAs of the construction industry? From the seven categories mentioned in art.3 (1) 
of the PWD, the CLAs contain rules in six of them: work and rest time (a), holiday 
(b), rates of pay (c), workers for a temporary employment agency (d), health and 
safety (e), protective measures (only with regard to the terms and conditions of 
employment for young people) (f). In the remaining field (equal treatment (g) only the 
legal rules apply (minimally) to posted workers. A special appendix stipulates which 
parts of the applicable provisions are meant for posted workers. Sometimes, the text 
of the applicable parts of the provisions is rewritten to adjust it to the situation of 
posted workers (references to Dutch provisions and situations have been deleted). In 
addition, a special explanation is given about the job-related pay system and 
guaranteed gross wages. Such highly detailed wage systems are customary in Dutch 
CLAs. Altogether, in the construction sector, only about half of the total extended 
agreement provisions applicable to domestic employees, apply to posted workers.
Still, practically all basic working and employment conditions are included.
According to a spokesman from the construction union, the exclusion of fringe 
benefits and other provisions meant for workers with an infinite employment contract 
(such as vocational training and stipulations about the end of an employment 
contract), makes posted workers around 25 % cheaper in labour costs than domestic 
workers.48
As soon as Art. 2(6) of the Act of Extension of Provisions of Collective Agreements 
was made applicable in all sectors by the end of 2005 (for the reasons behind this 
decision see section IV), social partners in the Temporary Work Agency sector have 
also started labelling and making accessible which CLA provisions correspond to the 
hard core of labour law in the PWD. To my knowledge, in other sectors this work has 
not been done yet, probably because social partners do not think the result is worth the
45 See UAW nr. 10141, Bijv. Stcrt. 5.4.2004, nr. 66: CAO voor schilders, afwerkings- en 
glaszetbedrijf, 2004-2007, 1 april 2004.
46 Like the CAO for plasterers and related companies (stukadoors, -afbouw, -vloerenleggersbedrijf 
(afbouw-cao) and may be the CAO for roofers (cao voor bitumineuze en kunststofdakdekkers 
(dakdekkers-cao), and even (partly) the CAO for mortar (cao voor mortel- en 
morteltransportondernemingen (mortel-cao), the CAO for carpenters-firms (cao timmerfabrieken 
(timmer-cao), the CAO for furnishing companies/industry (cao voor de meubelindustrie en 
meubileringsbedrijven) and the CAO for residence services (cao woondiensten).
47 Because everyone knows that posted workers will not easily resort to Court and probably are not 
aware of all their rights as well.
48 This estimation was made by one of the interviewed union representatives for the CLR Study. See 
Cremers/Donders, o.c., 2005.
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effort (national topics are much more important in the bargaining process). Moreover, 
in some sectors, like in transport, the CLA’s contain provisions which exclude posted 
workers from the scope of the CLA. This is in breach with Art. 2 (6) of the Act of 
Extension of Provisions of Collective Agreements. Since 2005 the hard core 
conditions of extended CLAs in all industries must be applied to posted workers. In 
this respect, it is interesting to note that the implementation of the PWD has limited 
the policy space for self-regulation of the social partners. They used to be free in the 
demarcation of the personal scope of their CLA, but in case they want to request for 
extension, Art. 2(6) of the Act of Extension of Provisions of Collective Agreements 
now limits this policy freedom with regard to posted workers.49
3.4.3 Exemption from or expiry o f extended CLA provisions
In practice, the application of (the mandatory hard core of) host state CLA-provisions 
depends on their extension. Just like (onorganised) domestic employers, foreign 
service providers have the possibility to submit a request for an exemption of the 
extended CLA, either to the Minister (see section 5.1 below) of Social Affairs, or to 
the CLA-parties. To my knowledge, the latter situation has once occurred in practice:
In the (extended) CLA for construction it is stated that an employer may send a 
request for exemption to a committee of social partner representatives. Although not 
mentioned in the text of the provision, the usual policy of this committee is to give 
only exemption when there is a CLA on company level that has on average the same 
level of wage and other conditions as the agreement on industry level. Sometimes 
however, exemption rests on other considerations: In case of the extended CLA 
Construction Industry 2001 social partners decided to grant an exemption to the Irish 
construction company ICDS. This was not based on a comparison of labour standards 
but on practical arguments, because ICDS delayed the extension of the CLA with 
objections against this extension that had to be dealt with by the Minister of Social 
Affairs. Since the subsequent CLA 2003-2004 this exemption was not granted again. 
The objections that ICDS brought in against extension were at that time all 
overruled.50 Moreover, the CLA 2003-2004 and its succeeders were improved with 
regard to their accessibility and clarity for foreign service providers and their 
employees.
Apart from the exemption possibility, the hard core of Dutch CLA provisions does not 
have to be applied either if the period of extension is expired before the renewal of the 
CLA. In practice, such periods without extension occur quite often in the 
Netherlands. After the renewal of an expired CLA it usually takes several months 
before the new provisions are extended. In the meantime no extension is applicable. 
The employers who are not bound themselves by the CLA, are free to apply other 
employment conditions to their workers until a new extension applies.
3.5. Optional derogations from host labour law terms and conditions
In the Netherlands no use is made of the optional derogations contained in Articles 
3(3) and 3(5) of the PWD. Up till now this does not seem to raise any particular 
problems in practice. The compulsory derogation for initial assembly and/or first
49 Sofar, stakeholders did not perceive of this restriction of their own competence as a problem and the 
Minister doesn’t seem to examine the personal scope during the extension procedure.
50 See AI nr. 9992, Bijvoegsel Stcrt. 29-9-2003, nr. 187, p. 2-3.
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installation of goods where this is an integral part of a contract for the supply of goods 
and necessary for taking the goods supplied into use and carried out by the skilled 
and/or specialist workers of the supplying undertaking, if the period of posting does 
not exceed eight days (Art. 3(2)), is not implemented either. For the construction 
sector this is not important because it is exempted from this obligation.
It can be gathered from the documents of Parliament about the Implementation Bill 
that the Dutch government intended to let social partners free to make use of Art.3 (4) 
Directive.51 But no transposition of this provision can be found in the Implementation 
Act, so one can question whether Art.3 (4) is sufficiently and recognizably 
implemented in the Netherlands. Probably not, since the evaluation of the European 
Commission showed that no Member States had implemented this provision.52 The 
attitude of the Dutch government is explicable in the light of the CLA for the 
Construction Industry which was in force at the time the Implementation Bill was 
drafted and enacted. From 1995 till 2001 this CLA stipulated that the rules for posted 
workers only applied for postings longer than a month (analogous to Dir. 91/533). 
Perhaps the Dutch government didn’t want to force social partners in construction to 
alter this into an application from the first day of posting. Nevertheless, as a result of 
collective bargaining social partners have altered this stipulation (Art. 1a) from 2001 
on. From that time on, extended CLA-provisions for posted workers apply from the 
first day that a posted worker starts working in the Dutch construction sector.
3.6. The favour principle and the method of comparison
Art. 3(7) of the PWD is not implemented explicitly in the Terms of Employment 
(Cross-Border Work) Act. Since the interpretation of this provision was at stake in the 
cases Laval and Ruffert, it is important to emphasise that in the Netherlands Art. 3(7) 
was read right from the beginning in the way the ECJ did in its rulings on these cases.
During the adoption process of the implementation act, some Members of Parliament 
asked in vain for codification of the favour principle, especially because in Dutch law 
no legal base exists for the favour principle. Moreover, Members of Parliament asked 
the Minister what method has to be followed in the Netherlands to compare the 
applicable labour conditions of the host country and the country of origin. Art. 3(7) 
gives posted workers a right to the most favourable terms and conditions of 
employment, but no method of comparison to determine this is prescribed. Is a 
comparison preferable on the level of each provision, or between units of provisions 
covering the same subject, or is a comparison of the whole package of working and 
employment conditions the right point of departure? According to the Minister, the 
Dutch legal system prescribes a comparison on the level of each provision because, in 
the case of posted workers only (a minimum level of) mandatory law is at stake. The
51 See Kamerstukken II, 1998-99, 26 524, nr. 3, p. 4 and nr. 6, p. 5: The government deemed deviation 
from the legislative minimum wage and minimum paid holiday level undesirable and inconsistent with 
the Dutch system. For additional entitlements in collective agreements a more flexible attitude was 
argued.
52 See COM (2003) 458 of 25 July 2003. STAR-Advice about Directive 96/71, nr. 11/00, o.c. 2000, p.
15 demonstrates that social partners on the national level also concluded that the optional derogation in 
Art. 3(4) was not implemented in the Netherlands. See also Van Hoek, Internationale mobiliteit van 
werknemers, SDU: Den Haag 2000, p. 516. She observes that implementation of Art. 3(4) Directive is 
in contradiction with the terms in Art. 2(6) AVV, that give no room for own policy to social partners.
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mandatory character of provisions does not allow the exchange of one provision for
53another, depending on the arbitrary preference of an individual worker.
In this regard, the Minister also mentioned the existing 1997 agreement between the 
Dutch and Belgian social partners in construction to acknowledge each other’s 
collective agreements as equivalent. The social partners took this bilateral initiative as 
a way of ‘repairing’ the in their eyes unsatisfactory consequences of the ECJ 
judgment in the case Guiot (Climatec) of 1996. In this case, a service provider 
protested against double charges in both the host state (Belgium) and the state of 
origin (Luxembourg) for contributions to so called social funds in the construction 
sector. Construction workers often work under short term contracts. In these 
circumstances, statutory labour law and social security law do not necessarily provide 
these workers with adequate social protection. Holiday rights, for example, are hard to 
realise for a worker who works for many different employers in the same calendar 
year. To solve this problem, social partners have often concluded collective 
agreements to create special funds for additional workers’ rights like holiday pay and 
bad weather payments. If these collective agreements are declared universally 
applicable, all employers in a particular country or region have to contribute to this 
fund, including foreign service providers with workers posted in the construction 
sector. In Guiot however, the ECJ ruled that the service provider only had to pay 
contributions in his own country of origin. Social partners in the construction sector 
criticised this judgment because the ECJ had only considered the type of social funds, 
not the level of payment which workers could derive from the funds and thus not the 
equivalence of the schemes. Therefore, the Belgian and Dutch social partners made a 
comparison of their CLAs, which led them to the conclusion that workers in both 
countries were provided protection at an equivalent level. This led to an agreement on 
the suspension of the application of the CLA of the host state. As a result, Belgian and 
Dutch service providers only had to apply their own CLA and to contribute to the 
holidays funds in their own countries and were no longer confronted with unjustified 
double charges. The German ULAK copied this initiative but limited it to the holidays 
funds, and has concluded multiple bilateral agreements with, e.g., French, Dutch, 
Belgian and Austrian holiday funds.54
As a result of the Belgian-Dutch agreement, the Belgian CLA applies to a posted 
worker that habitually works in Belgium during his period of posting in the 
Netherlands and vice versa. According to the Minister this agreement could be 
prolonged. But he added that if a posted worker from Belgium appeals to more 
favourable extended Dutch CLA-provisions, the Belgium provisions have to yield as 
far as minimum entitlements are concerned. As long as posted workers are satisfied 
with the agreement, no objections against a prolongation exist.55 This pragmatic 
attitude leaves enough room for collective bargaining to make the favour principle 
more workable in practice. The only reverse side of the coin is that it does not 
guarantee 100 % legal certainty for employers. But when only very few or even no
53 See ‘Handelingen II, 1998-99, nr. 104, p. 5980, 5987’. This statement is confirmed in a judgment of 
the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) , JAR 2000/43.
54 See for more details: M.S. Houwerzijl. & F.J.L. Pennings, (1999). Double Charges in Case of 
Posting of Employees : The Guiot Judgment and its Effects in the Construction Sector. The European 
Journal of Social Security, 1(1), 91-112.
55 See ‘Handelingen II, 1998-99, nr. 104, p. 5980, 5987’ and ‘Kamerstukken II, 1998-99, 26 524, nr. 6, 
p. 4-5.’ See also Sengers and Donders, SR 2001/5, p. 143. They speak of ‘gentlemen’s agreements’.
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individual appeals for deviance have to be expected, this may not be considered a 
problem.
3.7 Cooperation on information
To ensure the practical effectiveness of the PWD, Article 4 of the PWD provides for 
cooperation on information between the Member States. Liaison offices and 
authorities are designated to monitor the terms and conditions of employment and to 
serve as correspondents and contact points for authorities in other Member States, for 
undertakings posting workers and for the posted workers themselves. Article 4 obliges 
the Member States to appoint one or more liaison offices or one or more competent 
national bodies. In the Netherlands, the Labour Inspectorate is mentioned as the chief 
responsible organisation in this respect.56 Until 2005, the Labour Inspectorate did not 
report any difficulties when applying the provisions of the Directive. But, as we shall 
see further on when the Dutch enforcement system is explained, this is not per se a 
good sign because the Labour Inspectorate was hardly engaged in this task.
One of the tasks stipulated in Art. 4(2) PWD is to reply to reasoned requests from 
equivalent authorities in the other Member States for information on the transnational 
hiring-out of workers, including manifest abuses or possible cases of unlawful 
transnational activities. Until 2005, from France there has been two times a request (in 
2001) for information about Dutch companies that posted their workers to France.
The request consisted in a check of the correctness of the given information to the 
French authorities by the companies. Also, a German agency of the social partners in 
construction has once approached the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs with a 
question. This request was delegated to the Dutch social partners. Apart from the 
established practise that CLA related questions would be referred to social partners, 
no regular contacts about the Implementation Act and/or the application of the CLA 
provisions were reported between the Ministry and the social partners. The Dutch 
Labour Inspectorate didn’t make any requests to liaison offices in other Member 
States. In the group of Experts, installed by the Commission as proposed in their 
Evaluation,57 the improvement of the mutual administrative cooperation was taken up. 
Data of the persons to contact at the Ministries and liaison offices were exchanged 
and the intention was spoken out to keep this information up-to-date in the future.
In what way is the information on the terms and conditions of employment referred to 
in Article 3(1) of the PWD made generally available for workers and employers from 
other Member States (as required in Article 4(3) of the PWD)? It took quite a while 
before the text could be found rather easily on the website of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. At first instance, there were no plans to improve the accessibility of the 
information to the general public in spite of the strong recommendation to do so in the 
Evaluation of the EC Commission.58 However, this attitude changed after 
enlargement. The site of the Ministry (www.szw.nl) also refers to a free phone 
number (+31 800 9051) that can be dialled by individuals and companies to obtain
56 The Labour Inspectorate nor any other organisation is mentioned in the WAGA. Only the 
Parliamentary documents make clear that the Labour Inspectorate is to function as liaison office. Also 
the ‘Rijksverkeer inspectie’ is mentioned in the Documents but this organisation has only minor tasks 
in the enforcement of Dutch labour law. See Kamerstukken II, 1998-99, 26 524, nr. 6, p. 5.
57 See COM (2003) 458 of 25 July 2003, p.19/20.
58 See COM (2003) 458 of 25 July 2003, p.19/20.
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information. Furthermore, it provides the possibility of submitting questions by e­
mail. From September 2003 on social partners in the construction sector publish a 
special leaflet in the English language, aimed at posted workers and their employers. 
This leaflet gives rather detailed and comprehensive information about the provisions 
applicable to posted workers. At the back of the leaflet the public information phone 
number of the Ministry of Social Affairs is referred to for more information about 
Dutch statutory regulations. On social partners level until recently no website 
information was available. On plans to translate the brochure in at least the German 
language no agreement could be reached between the social partners. According to 
union representatives, insufficient financial budgets played a role.59 In 2005 the 
TWA-sector was the first to start with publishing leaflets and making information 
available through its website, even in the Polish language.
3.8 Measures aimed at compliance
Article 5 PWD states that Member States shall take appropriate measures in the event 
of failure to comply with the Directive. So, the Government is held responsible for 
(the supervision of) compliance with the transposed PWD in the Implementation Act 
and the other applicable statutory (and extended collective agreement) provisions. 
Therefore, the government has to ensure in particular that adequate procedures are 
available to workers and/or their representatives for the enforcement of obligations 
under the PWD. But because the Dutch enforcement system is mainly based on 
private law, the Dutch government did not have any special control mechanisms to 
prevent fraud and to assure the correct application of the Directive. Thus, at first 
instance it was fully left to the posted workers and the social partners involved, to 
ensure the Directive’s correct application and, if possible, to prevent fraud.
In this respect, Article 4 of the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act 
transposes Article 6 of the Posting Directive (on jurisdiction) in the Code of Civil 
Procedures. Thus, it is safeguarded that the Dutch judge has jurisdiction to decide in 
judicial proceedings started by a posted worker. Moreover, unions are entitled to start 
judicial proceedings on behalf of posted workers or on the basis of their own interest 
in enforcement of the Directive. This is laid down in Articles 3:305a and 305b of the 
Dutch Civil Code. As far as extended CLA provisions are concerned, Article 3 of the 
the Act of Extension of Provisions of Collective Agreements entitles unions and 
employers’ organisations to institute proceedings in their capacity as parties to the 
collective labour agreement.
In Parliamentary Debate the Minister was asked in what way the government 
interprets its task to ensure the effective enforcement of the PWD in the Netherlands. 
According to the Minister, the Labour Inspectorate and to some extent the 
‘Rijksverkeer inspectie’ have the supervision on the enforcement of for example 
working conditions and working times. This occurs when a provision in the Acts 
concerned is sanctioned with a penalty or fine (according to criminal or administrative 
law). In this respect no difference is made between Dutch and foreign companies. But 
most of the applicable legal provisions on posted workers are of a private law 
character. Not only provisions in the Civil Code but also provisions with a public law 
character like the Act on Minimum Wages were at that time mainly sanctioned by
59 See CLR-Country report the Netherlands 2005
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private law mechanisms. And the enforcement of CLA-provisions belongs 
substantially to the competence of the social partners themselves.60 Some help is 
provided for in public Acts, where is laid down that social partners or individual 
workers can ask the Labour Inspectorate for example to check working conditions in 
specific companies.61 However, insiders generally agree that these possibilities do not 
mean very much in practise because the Labour inspectorate has a huge workload and 
is not able or prepared very often to give priority to these requests.
The Minister defended this system of enforcement, which is quite atypical compared 
to other Member States, like for instance our direct neighbours Belgium and 
Germany. Main advantage for the state is that the costs are limited.62 But also in 
purely domestic situations critics have warned that the trust in this system might be 
too high where the ability of workers to lay down their claim in court is concerned.63 
In the Parliamentary Debate a Member of Parliament proposed to oblige employers to 
announce in their specifications of public work contracts whether they work with 
posted workers. But the Dutch Government had complained by German authorities 
about such a duty for the sake of Dutch employers who post workers to German 
construction sites. So imposing such a duty on the Dutch sites would not be very 
consequent in that respect. Another suggestion of this Member of Parliament was to 
make use of the E-101 documents as a control mechanism because employers need to 
obtain these forms anyway to let their posted workers stay insured under the social 
security system of their Home State (see Regulation 1408/71).64 Nothing was done 
with this idea.
3.9 Observations
In this section the Dutch legislative (and partly practical) process of implementing the 
PWD was examined. In all matters that were examined above, the ‘neutral’ motto of 
the government in its implementation Bill, namely ‘to transpose not more or less than 
necessary’, was consistently and succesfully upheld. According to the Minister this 
neutral stance was guided by the general government guidelines on the 
implementation of EU-Directives, which is based on avoiding unnecessary ‘national 
supplements’ to European legislation.65 Therefore, all options in the PWD to do less 
or more than strictly necessary were left out of the Bill. Politically, this attitude was 
fully in line with the deregulation and free-market philosopy which was at its 
heyday66 during the second government of secular liberal and social democrat 
political parties (so-called purple goverments). To apply a neutral attitude 
(disregarding as much as possible the domestic interests) to such a politically sensitive
60 See kamerstukken II,1998-99, 26 524, nr. 6, p. 4 and Hand. II, 1998-99, p. 5987.
61 See Art. 18a WMM, Art. 21 WGB m/v, Art. 10 Wet AVV. Often this help from the Labour 
Inspectorate can only be asked for in case of a lawsuit or when legal proceedings are at least prepared.
62 See Handelingen II, 1998-99, p. 5986-87.
63 See for instance Klosse (ed.), .. 2003, p. 272.
64 See Handelingen II, 1998-99, nr. 104, p. 5983.
65 See Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving, nr. 337, and more extensively Houwerzijl, Diss. 2005, p. 
291.
66 Its rise and fall in popularity may be situated between 1996 and 2009, marked by the embrace of the 
so-called ‘Third way’ by the leader of the social-democrat-party Wim Kok, in a key-note lecture on 11 
December 1995 (Den Uyl lezing) and the departure from it by his successor Wouter Bos in a key-note 
lecture of 25 January 2010 (Den Uyl lezing).
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subject matter as posting of workers led however to a (too)67 minimalistic and 
sometimes rather indifferent implementation of the PWD. This is in particular true 
regarding the (1) practical effectiveness of the PWD, (2) the personal scope of the 
PWD and (3) the limiting of the substantive scope to only extended CLA-provisions 
mentioned in the Appendix of the PWD (the construction industry).
With regard to the latter issue, it seems as if the government deliberately disregarded 
its own system of extension of CLA-provisions which aims at furthering collective 
bargaining on a sectoral level by temporarily eliminating the possibility of labour cost 
competition among firms during the duration of the extension. Since 1937 this system 
has been widely used and supported, but it became controversial in the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the system survived the attacks from neo-liberal academics and 
policymakers but this came at a price: from 1997 till 2007 a very liberal exemption- 
policy was implemented (elaborated upon below in section IV).68 During the 
implementation process of the PWD the possibility that foreign service providers 
would undercut Dutch labour standards was consistently ignored or trifled. In 
contrast, the Minister underlined the problems experienced by Dutch companies 
posting workers to Germany in its defence to apply as less host state labour law as 
possible to posted workers and he advised the Parliament to first wait and see how 
other countries implemented the PWD at this point. Although the Parliament 
remained very critical and a majority favoured a broadening of the substantive scope 
to all industries in order to create la level-playing field of fair competition between 
domestic and foreign companies, it didn’t make it a breaking point when the 
government persisted in its refusal to use the option laid down in Art. 3(10), second 
indent of the PWD and it adopted the Bill in full.
With regard to the ‘neutral’ but insufficient implementation of the PWD regarding its 
practical effectiveness and its personal scope, it seems that the government was more 
concerned with preserving national autonomy than with loyalty to the EU-integration 
process. This factor is explicitly visible in the defence of the Minister of ‘our private- 
law based enforcement system of labour law’. Not sticking to the traditional passive 
enforcement tradition of the state in labour law would simply cost too much money. 
Reluctance to re-examine the adequacy of the national sytem may also have guided 
the inaccurate implementation of the personal scope, because the definition and the 
three situations of posting in the PWD didn’t fit into the domestic definition of this 
phenomenon. As a result nowhere in the Dutch Implementation Act it is made clear 
that posting of workers takes place in the framework of service provision and that 
these workers are supposed to habitually work in another Member State. Lacking 
knowledge or awareness of the role of EU-free movement law in this subject matter 
may have played a role in overlooking or ignoring this aspect of the PWD. Moreover, 
the dominant PIL-perspective (see section II) on the legal position of posted workers 
may have strenghtened the misunderstanding of the personal scope of the PWD by the 
Dutch legislators. In this context it is remarkable that the CLA for the Construction 
Industry has implemented a more accurate definition of a posted worker.
67 The Netherlands forgot to implement Art. 3(2) of the PWD which consists o f an obligatory 
exemption from the hard core for very short postings for first installation o f a newly purchased 
machine for example).
68 See in extenso Houwerzijl, M.S. (2007), ‘De golfbeweging in het dispensatiebeleid op grond van de 
Wet avv (1992-2007)’, in: A.T.J.M. Jacobs, F.J.L. Pennings (red.), Een prettige Fase in het sociaal 
recht, Liber Amicorum voor Prof. W.J.P.M. Fase, (p. 135-151). Zutphen: Paris.
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Thus, the initial implementation of the PWD was guided by a ‘neutral’ approach with 
blind spots for the ‘prevention of unfair competition’ and the ‘furthering of effective 
employment protection of posted workers’ aims of the Directive. However, as far as 
the Dutch ‘neutral’ implementation was meant to further the third goal behind the 
PWD of ‘enhancing the free movement of services within the EU’, this must purely 
be understood in the legal, PIL-interpretation of this aim (see the recitals of the PWD) 
to further transparency and legal certainty: during the parliamentary adoption process 
the undesirability of the applicability of more than one legal system on the 
employment contract of posted workers was emphasised several times. At first 
instance the Minister even send a Bill to the Parliament in which also the application 
of the hard core labour standards in statutory law was limited to the construction 
industry. This omission was quickly repaired after discovery. Hence, furthering legal 
certainty and simplicity (fitting into the deregulation-hype) may have been the main 
drive behind the Dutch implementation of the PWD.
IV The Enlargement and the debate on the Services Directive -  influence on the 
(enforcement of) rules concerning posting of workers in the Netherlands
4.1 The Dutch transitional regime for the free movement of workers
From 1 May 2004 on nationals from 8 of the 10 new Member States (hereinafter EU8 
nationals) were denied full access to the Community law right to freely move to and 
reside in the Netherlands for the purposes of work (old art. 39 EC, now art 45 TFEU); 
instead, national migration law initially governed EU8 nationals’ labour market 
access, which meant they were still treated as third country nationals for whom a 
work permit was required to gain access to the Dutch labour market. The possibility 
to impose these temporary restrictions on the right to free movement is enshrined in 
the Accession Treaty between the new and the old (hereinafter EU15) Member States. 
The Accession Treaty allows the EU15 Member States to derogate from elements of 
the free movement of workers acquis until ultimately 1 May 2011.
Until November 2003, when the Ministers of Finance (against) and of Economic 
Affairs (in favour) came into conflict about this subject, the government had favoured 
the immediate opening up of the Dutch labour market after accession of the EU8 
countries. In the following months running up to the enlargement, all the arguments 
pro and con passed by in heated debates in parliament and in the public press. The 
combination of concern about rising unemployment69 and more importantly, the 
perceived increasing chance on unmanageable influxes of EU8workers on the labour 
market now that more and more other EU15 states had already made policy U-turns 
and announced that transitional measures would be implemented, were the official 
reasons to adopt a transitional regimed in Spring 2004. However, the concerns about 
negative public reaction to the immediate extension of mobility rights to EU8 
nationals seems to have been an important hidden factor motivating transitional 
restrictions rather than any convincing evidence of probable labour market
69 Which in hindsight proved only to be a small interruption in a booming economy until mid 2008.
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disruption. In this context, the rising popularity of populist political parties from
712001 on, seems to be of crucial importance.
Whatever the general public might have expected, in reality, the transitional 
arrangements were not meant as a measure to stop immigration. On the contrary, 
immediately from 1 May 2004 on thousands of EU8 migrants got work permits every 
month to help alleviate labour shortage in specific sectors of the labour markets, like 
transport and agriculture. The flexible design of the transitional measures made it 
possible to adapt the rules every three months to changings labour market needs. Only 
three years after the enlargment, in May 2007, the Netherlands lifted the last 
restrictions on the free movement of workers from the EU8 (for the EU2 countries 
Bulgaria and Rumania a transitional regime was enacted from 1 January 2007 on 
which still exists).
4.2 Policy change nr. 1 and the factors behind it.
4.2.1 Expanding the substantive scope o f the Implementation Act
In the slipstream of the dispute on the transitional arrangement in the Autumn of 
2003, the debate on broadening the scope of the Dutch implementation Act in order to 
create a level playing field for domestic and foreign companies and workers was 
opened again. Left-wing politicians and also the trade-union were in favour of 
opening the borders to the EU8workers from day 1 but linked this to the need to 
prevent social dumping. At first, the government kept defending its ‘neutral’ position 
and the majority of the Parliament still accepted this, despite continuing attempts by 
supporters of ‘expanding the scope’ to put the item on the legislative agenda again. It 
was only after enlargement, in the Summer of 2004, that the Government (now used 
to U turns) made a U-turn, officially because Dutch employers had complained about 
unfair competition related to the influx of cheap (posted) workers. Thus, in the 
Autumn of 2004, a Bill was sent to the House of Representatives with the proposal to 
broaden the scope of the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act to all 
universally applicable collective agreements. This Bill was adopted and enacted from 
14 December 2005 on.72 Apart from the official reason behind the U-turn, two 
important other developments in the context of cross-border mobility of workers and 
the opening up of services market in the Autumn of 2004 seem to have informed this 
decision. First of all, the discussion on the draft Services Directive (see below 4.2.2) 
and secondly the acknowledgment that posting of workers in the framework of service 
provision could not be restricted by the transitional regime (4.2.3).
4.2.2 The evolving debate about the ‘Bolkestein Directive ’
The slowly evolving Dutch debate about the proposal for a Services Directive, 
launched by the Dutch Internal Market Commissioner Bolkestein in January 2004, 
became serious in the Autumn of 2004. Public press reported that the government was 
divided on this proposal. The Minister of Economic Affairs was positive, the Minister
70
70 See for a general overview of the decisionmaking process on transitional regimes, Tamas/Munz 
2006*
71 In May 2002, the charismatic leader Pim Fortuyn was killed shortly before a landslide victory in the 
Parliament elections (lower house), which marked the end of 8 years of coalition government between 
the (secular) parties of social-democrats and liberals.
72 See ‘Kamerstukken II, 2004/05, 29 983, nr. 1’. Stb. 2005, 626, 13 December 2005).
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of Justice hesitated, because the legal implications of this draft were far from clear. 
The part of the draft legislation that caused most discussion was the ‘country of 
origin’ principle. Former opponents of expanding the scope of the Terms of 
Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act to all universally applicable collective 
agreements suddenly saw it as an argument to take away the public fear that 
companies setting up services in the Netherlands could do so according to the labour
74standards in their own country. In December 2004 the government, also at the 
request of the parliament, asked the SER (Social and Economic Council) to issue 
advice regarding the draft Services Directive. In its advice of May 2005, the 
influential Social Economic Council (SER) stated that it assumed that the parliament 
would adopt the expansion of the Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Worker) Act, 
since ‘This legislative proposal guarantees that it will be possible to properly manage 
the increase in cross-border service transactions and therefore the increase in posted 
workers’.
Next, the SER-Advice states that the exclusion of only those aspects of the country of 
origin principle that are regulated by the PWD is not sufficient to guarantee the 
desired neutrality of the Services Directive in respect of existing European 
employment law in cross-border situations, as there are cross-border situations in 
which the PWD does not or no longer apply. In these situations the Rome Convention 
is relevant. Those aspects of employment contracts that are regulated by the Rome 
Convention were not excluded from the country of origin principle. The SER 
therefore adviced amending the draft Services Directive in order to ensure that the 
Rome Convention will continue to apply in respect of employment contracts, ‘of 
course with due observance of the specific stipulations regarding posting in the 
PWD’.75
Furthermore, whilst supportive of the aim to establish a better balance between 
enforcement of employment law on the one hand and market opening on the other 
hand, the SER rejected the proposed provisions (in Art. 24 and 25) to limit the 
competence of the host state concerning the abolishment of certain disproportionate 
national authorisation schemes and the improvement of controls in respect of the 
compatibility between the employment terms and conditions and the PWD. In its final 
assessment the SER emphasised that ‘Confidence in efficient collaboration between 
the Member States and in strict enforcement is a basic condition for the proper 
functioning of the country of origin principle: after all, the Member States must be 
able to rely on the fact that public interests are sufficiently guaranteed in the Member 
State of establishment.’
Since the final version of the Services Directive turned out more ‘limited’ than the 
SER had adviced in its report of 2005,76 it didn’t stir any noticeable commotion 
among Dutch social partners and the major political parties. It is worth noticing that 
the central-left-wing politicians in the Netherlands were more supportive of the draft 
Services Directive than central-right-wing parties in neighbouring parties such as
73
73 See Houwerzijl, Diss. 2005, p. 299, footnote 106.
74 See Houwerzijl, Diss. 2005, p. 299 and Press Release SER unaniem over dienstenrichtlijn 20 May
2005.
75 See SER-Advice 2005 on the draft Services Directive.
76 For example: The SER had adviced to stick to the Country of Origin Principle and to keep the 
temporary agency branche within the scope of the proposed Directive.
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Belgium. In my view, this perfectly illustrates the predominantly EU-loyal free 
market mindset of the Dutch political and industrial establishment, although these 
views are most of the time carefully mitigated with concerns for preservation of the 
‘social model’.77 Illustrative for the blind eye this establishment (often) seems to turn 
to the feelings of resentment of ‘the ordinary people’ is the remark of the chairman of 
the largest employers association VNO-NCW on the day of the release of the SER- 
advice on the draft Services Directive: He was proud of the civilized and sensible tone 
of the Dutch debate on the Services Directive in our country, unlike a country such as
78France where one speaks ‘cheap and populistic’ about a Frankenstein-Directive. 
Eleven days later, almost 62 % of the Dutch voters rejected the Constitutional 
Treaty.79
4.2.3 Partial lifting o f transitional regime for posting o f EU8 workers 
The second factor that facilitated the expansion of the Terms of Employment (Cross­
Border Worker) Act, was the acknowledgement of the Dutch Government, as a 
consequence of the judgment of the ECJ in Case C-445/03 (Commission v 
Luxembourg) of 21 October 2004, that the transitional regime for the free movement
of workers, does not include workers posted by EU8 companies making use of their
80(unrestricted) freedom to provide services in the Netherlands. Therefore, Dutch 
government announced that ‘in the near future’ no work permit would be required 
anymore for this group. In December 2005, the transitional regime for the free 
movement of EU8 workers was changed as follows:
‘Foreign service providers for whom the free movement of services applies, who want to offer a 
service in the Netherlands using their own employees (i.e. posting of workers as mentioned in article 1, 
sub 3 (a) of the Directive) for whom the free movement of workers within the Netherlands does not 
pertain, are exempted from applying for work permits for their employees under the following 
conditions:
• The service provider is established outside the Netherlands in a country, where the rules for the
free movement of services apply and is not only a post office box business;
• The services provided do not involve the posting of workers or an undertaking engaged in
making labour available;
• The services are reported to the Centre for Work and Income (CWI) before their
commencement.
Posted employees as mentioned in article 1, sub 3 (b) (i.e. posting of workers to an establishment or to 
an undertaking owned by the group in the territory of a member state) and sub 3 (c) of the Directive 
(i.e. hiring out of workers to a user by a temporary undertaking or placement agency) are exempted 
from the notification system and need to apply for work permits. ‘81
77 The enthusiasm for ‘flexicurity’ and the Lisbon Strategy also fit into this picture. One of the assumed 
reasons behind the rise o f populist parties seems to be the absense of disagreement about these socio­
economic issues between the (traditionally) major political parties on the central, left- and right wing.
78 See: SER unaniem over dienstenrichtlijn, press release 20 May 2005.
79 Two days earlier, on 29 May 2005, in France, ‘only’ 55 % voted no. Although some voted no 
because they wanted a more social Europe, there seem to have been a lot o f different reasons for the 
no-votes. From the interviews with no-voters however the picture rose that their vote was often not 
based on informed political arguments, but foremost on a dislike of the ‘arrogance’ of the elite: ‘People 
are unhappy with the fact that Europe is a project of the elite, not the ordinary people’. See, ‘Varied 
reasons behind Dutch No, BBC 1 June 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4601731.stm.
80 See also under section 3.2.3 for the implementation of the PWD on posting from third countries.
81 docs.minszw.nl/pdf/135/2006/135_2006_1_14765.pdf
ec. europa. eu/social/aj ax/Blob Servlet?docId=2367&langId=en
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So, the recognition that posting of workers by EU8 companies could not be restricted 
by the transitional regime, was limited to what the Dutch Government understood as 
‘real’ posting situations. For these archetype ‘Rush Portuguesa’ type of posting 
situations (as codified in Art. 1(3)(c) of the PWD service providers from the EU8 did 
not need a work permit anymore, but they remained obliged to notify postings to the 
authorities. According to the new rules from December 2005 on, (some of the) 
situations of posting defined in Art. 1(3)(b) and all situations defined in Art. 1(3)(c) of 
the PWD are no situations of ‘genuine’ posting, since these worker from the new 
Member States enter the Dutch labour market. The obligation to obtain a work permit 
is therefore deemed necessary in these situations to monitor and prevent abuse of the 
freedom to provide services in the EU (with reference to Commission/Luxembourg 
(C-445/03) and Commission/Germany (C-244/04). In relation to the ‘non-genuine 
situations of posting cases’ were brought before the administrative judge against fines 
imposed by the Labour Inspection because of the alleged non-compliance to the 
transitional regime. On 29 july 2009 the judicial department of the Council of State 
postponed several of these cases and posed preliminary questions to the EUCJ (Cases 
C-307-09/09).82
4.3 Policy change nr. 2: More stringent monitoring and enforcement of Dutch 
labour law
4.3.1 Background
Apart from expanding the scope of the Terms of Conditions (Cross-border worker) 
Act, the partial denouncement of the transitional regime on posting of workers by 
EU8-service providers in 2005 stirred the Dutch government also to intensified action 
with regard to the enforcement of labour law, now that they couldn’t use migrant law 
tools anymore to monitor the entrance and labour standards of posted EU8 workers. 
The emphasis in the SER-advice (see above section 4.2.1) on the need of proper 
enforcement as a basis for opening up national services markets also marked the shift 
in thinking about enforcement issues.
Since the beginning of the new century, the increasing presence of Eastern European
83workers on the Dutch labour market who appeared to be more prone to abstain from 
their rights, had led to an increase of exploitative or abusive employment relationships 
on the Dutch labour market. Moreover, locking ‘the front door’ to the Dutch labour 
market after the enlargement in 2004, stimulated an increasing use of ‘the backdoor’, 
most notably through reliance on temporary employment agencies and employer- 
organised schemes. These methods may be legal or illegal and consequently offer less 
or no labour law protection compared to more regular forms of employment. As 
numerous research studies have confirmed, the EU8 migrants were mostly hired as 
cheap workers, unaware of their rights and/or not interested in them either (because 
they were still in a better position than in their own country). As a result of the
82 Must Articles 49 EC and 50 EC be interpreted as precluding a national arrangement, under which a 
work permit is required for the hiring-out of workers? On the basis of what criteria should it be 
determined whether workers have been hired out within the meaning of Article 1(3c) o f the PWD?
83 For example: In an inquiry called ‘Ethnic minorities and foreigners in construction’, EIB concludes 
in 2004 that approximately 1,450 Germans are employed by Dutch building companies, posted, 
working on temporary contracts or as self-employed persons. Among these Germans, there were a 
number of Polish citizens with German passports. There were also 834 other foreign workers and 300 
Polish painters working on temporary employment contracts.
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increased demand for and supply of ‘cheap labour’, Dutch sectors such as the road 
transport, the construction industry, agriculture, the fish and meat processing 
industries, the hospitality business, and the temporary employment agencies sector, 
competition were disturbed by the (legal, grey and black) supply of EU8 (posted)
84employees and (bogus) self-employed workers. Apart from the legal and illegal 
possibilities to circumvent the transitional restrictions on the free movement of 
workers, for some 100.000 EU8 nationals work permits have been issued out in the 
three years that the transitional regime lasted. Next to abusive labour relationships, 
unsafe and illegal housing situations, broadly exposed in the press, became a growing 
problem for municipalities with a lot of (in majority Polish) workers.
The attitude of the Dutch press has varied since the EU8 workers made their entrance 
on the Dutch labour market. Initially, the Dutch government was heavily criticised by 
the left-wing and liberal85 (in general EU-loyal) spectrum of the press after making 
the decision to impose a transitional regime on the entrance of EU8 workers to the 
Dutch labour market. The right-wing (populistic) media however applauded this step. 
After enlargement gradually more stories were released in both spectrums of the press 
(although differing in tone) on abusive situations and/or of perceived social dumping. 
Often this led to questions in the Lower House of Parliament. In August 2005 for 
instance, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment was asked in Parliament if 
rumours were true that thousands of construction workers lost their jobs because of 
the lower labour costs of Polish employees. The Minister responded that there were 
no signs of substantial loss of employment by Dutch construction workers. Although 
the number of job-seekers increased slightly between July 2004 and July 2005, the 
number of construction workers looking for employment decreased by 3.8 %. 
Nevertheless, the Minister did not rule out increasing competition in construction and 
a subsequent loss of employment.
Although less frequent than negative stories there has, though, in the press also been 
recognition of an apparent good work ethic demonstrated by Polish migrant workers 
and they were even celebrated as a role model for unwilling Dutch unemployed since 
they were working in occupations not (easily) filled by domestic workers.
4.3.2 Supportive measures to enhance enforcement as precondition for lifting the 
transitional regime
In May 2007, the government could lift the last restrictions on the free movement of 
workers from the EU8 only in cooperation with the representatives from both sides of 
industry in the Foundation of Labour.86 In a framework agreement between those 
parties and the Minister of Social Affairs special supporting measures were proposed 
to enhance the enforcement of applicable employment conditions in order to prevent 
social dumping. The Labour Inspectorate was to play a more active role in controlling
Ecorys-report 2006.
85 In the Netherlands, a liberal politician must be understood as someone who predominantly supports 
‘enlightened’ (secular) tolerant point of views on immaterial issues such as abortus, euthanasia, 
freedom of opinion, open migration policies etc., traditionally associated with left-wing parties, but on 
socio-economic issues fancies the free market philosophy.
86 The Foundation of Labour (Stichting van de Arbeid) is a joint body of the national employers- and 
trade union federations. The Foundation plays an important role in the negotiations on employment 
conditions and advises the government on social policy measures.
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and in addition, a penal provision has been added to the Minimum Wages Act. An 
employer offending this Act may forfeit a fine up to € 6700,- per worker.
The introduction of an administrative fine was a remarkable step since it added public 
enforcement to (underused) private enforcement of the Law on minimum wages. The 
measure was adopted by Parliament and enacted in 2007.
However, this agreement with the social partners didn’t come overnight. Several 
times before, the government had tried in vain to find a majority in Parliament for 
lifting the restrictions. By the end of March 2006, the government had already 
announced that from January 1st 2007 onwards, the Netherlands would allow free
87movement for EU8 workers. According to the government, freedom of movement 
for workers was inevitable and further postponement would lead to an increase in the 
number of self-employed from the new EU-countries and an increase of the number 
of illegal practices. To show its concern for a proper enforcement of labour law to this 
new group of workers on the Dutch labour market, the government announced to 
implement a number of measures first in order to prevent unfair competition. Most of 
these were practical measures on information and cooperation.
For instance, the Tax Department and the Labour Inspectorate would cooperate more 
closely to counter illegal labour, undeclared employment and migrant workers posing 
as bogus self employed (1). The Labour Inspectorate would also start notifying 
workers and trade unions of cases of infringement of the Law on minimum wages, 
with the aim to facilitate taking matters to court to demand back payment. By passing 
on information trade unions could better enforce observance of CLAs (2). Next, cross­
border cooperation agreements would be made with competent authorities on tax on 
wages and social security contributions (3) and the government would support 
information campaigns initiated by employers’ organizations and trade unions, to 
raise awareness among EU8 workers on the Dutch (hard core of) labour standards 
they are entitled to (4).
Parliamentary debates on the issue in April 2006, however, revealed broad opposition 
to the plan. The Christian Democrats party and the Labour party, demanded further 
guarantees that an expected influx -  primarily of Poles - would not lead to unfair 
competition for Dutch workers. This was in line with the opinion of the largest trade 
union of the country, FNV. The government had to postpone a final decision on the 
opening of the labour market until the end of 2006. First, another report had to be 
submitted to the parliament on planned measures to prevent abuse of labour market
rules. In the meantime, the government reported to the European Commission that it
88would stick to its current restrictions.
4.3.3 The better enforcement approach
It must be noted that the supportive measures to lift the transitional regime for EU8 
migrants, have been taken in a general political environment focused on repressing 
illegal migration. Thus, the focus in issues of compliance seems to have been shifted
87 Government information service, 31 March 2006. See the International Site o f the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment at
http://internationalezaken.szw.nl/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp document&link id=91120, and o Press 
Release SZW 06/005.
88 See, Mark Beunderman , ‘Dutch postpone labour market opening decision’, 13.04.2006 at: 
http://euobserver.com/9/21383.
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from regulation to suppression through increased controls and fines. This is 
accompanied by stricter policies (and policy proposals) towards people staying 
illegally and towards asylum-seekers. 9 In March 2005 for example, the Christian 
Democratic Party (CDA) insisted on higher sanctions to combat illegal employment 
of foreign workers. They asked the fine for illegal employment to be raised from
8,000 to 10.000 € a head. Since, the issue has been prominently on the political 
agenda. One of the parliamentarians stressed that illegal employment is a widespread 
phenomenon and that sanctions are apparently not severe enough to have a real 
impact.90
In the last decade, the trend therefore is better enforcement of existing laws and 
regulations and the improvement of control and sanctions. Not only the authorities, 
also social partners have made efforts to better compliance in their branches of 
industry. The majority of (in majority) Polish workers in the Netherlands workers are 
engaged through temporary employment agencies or intermediaries based in Poland, 
Germany or the Netherlands.91 Often constructions are semi-legal: a migrant worker 
is on the pay roll for the statutory minimum wage per month, which is based on a 40- 
hour working week. In practice the migrant worker makes more than 60 hours per 
week, which decreases his wage per hour substantially. Another popular practice is to 
pay on a regular wage level, but to deduct costs for tools, working clothes etc. from 
the wage, because everything that is needed to get the work done has to be hired via 
the intermediary. 92 Therefore, many measures aiming at better enforcement are 
targeted at the Temporary Work Agencies branch, as an exploratory -  and thus 
incomplete - overview of initiatives below93 will show. Although there are successes 
in the short-run, nevertheless there is no (convincing) evidence that the problems with 
non-compliance are diminishing in the longer run, probably due to the fact that the 
demand for ever cheaper labour is simply too high. At best, the authorities may keep 
pace with the increase of the phenomenon (or they may be helped by a long economic 
downturn).
a) Cooperation o f authorities in Intervention Teams.
In sectors with much abuse, such as agriculture and horticulture, the temporary 
agency sector, construction, transport, cleaning and retail, the competent authorities 
work together in so-called intervention teams. The activities of such an Intervention 
Team (IT) are announced in public press some weeks or months before the operation 
starts, but individual employers are not informed beforehand when and where 
inspections will take place. The Press releases by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment have a presumed precautionary effect.
The IT controls all possible forms of undeclared labour: illegal foreign employment (a 
task of the Labour Inspectorate), evasion of taxes and social security contributions (a 
task of the tax authorities), bogus self-employment, and benefit-fraud (a task of the 
UWV). The inspectors of the IT also envisage illegal housing, which is one of the
89 Robbert van het Kaar, HSI, EIRO 2004.
90 Parlementarian Newsletter 16 March 2005.
91 Research voor Beleid 2004, p. 39-40.
92 Information from union spokesmen, see also ‘Grievance copybook’ Jij, Jerzy, FNV Bondgenoten, 
2006.
93 Based on a (slightly updated) survey in Bosse/Houwerzijl, CLR-report Undeclared work in the 
Netherlands, 2006.
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side-effects of the illegal employment of foreign workers, and the observance of 
safety regulations. Dangerous situations are reported by the Labour Inspectorate and 
will be sanctioned later. Other institutions involved are the Foreign Nationals 
Registration Office, de SVB, the SIOD and the local government. Sometimes more 
than 70 inspectors operate together.
During the operations, workers who are not able to identify themselves will be 
booked. Their employer will receive an administrative fine of 8,000 € a head per day. 
Foreign workers who are not allowed to stay will be expelled by the Foreign 
Nationals Registration Office. The sanctions of the tax authorities are severe: a refund 
of income taxes and contributions together with a fine.
b) More manpower for more labour inspections.
The number of inspections was gradually increased from 3,900 in 2003 to 10,500 in 
the year 2006. The number of labour inspectors has doubled from 80 to more than 
160.
c) Notification o f new employees from the first day o f work.
In an effort to tackle unreliable temporary work agencies (but also undeclared work in 
general) employers became obliged to notify a new employee on the first day of work 
to the relevant tax and social security organisations on 1 July 2006. However, on 1 
January 2009, this measure was abolished again because it was deemed 
disproportionate and not very effective.94 Now, the Tax Inspector may only oblige 
certain risk groups of employers to notify each employee on the first day of work.
e) Complaint desks:
Several Trade Unions installed permanent or temporary complaints desks for their 
members to report unfair competition by foreign workers not respecting the CLA. The 
results have once been used for a naming- and shaming report, which caused a lot of 
troubles with the employers side of the branche (road transport).95
f) Self regulation through quality lables and compliance offices
The Temporary Work Agency (TWA) witnessed a sharp increase in the number of 
unreliable temp agencies since the abolishment of the permit system in 1998. To 
combat fraud and other abuses, the employers association ABU (also with an eye to 
prevent the reintroduction of a permit system) has developed a quality label. This is 
meant to distinguish trustworthy agencies from their unreliable colleagues. It enables 
user companies to choose a qualified agency that adheres to the rules. Since 1 January 
2007, temporary work agencies established in the Netherlands can acquire this quality 
label -  known as NEN-norm 4400 Part 1 -  from the National Standardisation Institute 
(Nederlands centrum van normalisatie, NEN) when they have been shown to fulfil 
requirements concerning the payment of statutory minimum wages, taxes and social 
insurance and the legitimacy of employment in the Netherlands. The assessment is 
made by private certifying companies. After certification, the temporary work agency
94 See http://www.antwoordvoorbedriiven.nl/product/nieuwe-wet--en-regelgeving/fin/FIN— 
Afschaffing-eerstedagsmelding?branch=62. In this informational webside the government emphasised 
that the first-day notice obligation caused annoyance among employers.
95 See http://www.fnvbouw/for,/meldpunt/illegalebouw.html.; see also FNV black book ‘Jij, Jerzy’, 
200, the result o f a temporary complaint desk for the duration of a couple of months in the road 
transport sector.
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will be registered by the Foundation for Employment Standards (Stichting Normering 
Arbeid, SNA). Regular monitoring of the registered agencies on compliance with the 
applicable law and regulations and on their payment record must ensure that the 
agencies stay on the right track. Otherwise, a non-compliant agency will be removed 
from the register.96 Next to this, social partners in TWA have established an 
independent Compliance office, incorporated in the extended CLAs from 2004 on, 
which has been given the task to monitor compliance to the CLA provisions.
Recently, more and more (extended) CLAs of other industries have introduced a 
clause obliging the employer to contract a qualified temporary work agency in order 
to promote certification of agencies.
With regard to the enforcement of CLA-provisions most social partners do not yet 
have a very active tradition. In general there was no urgency for a very active 
approach until some seven years ago. However, following the example of active 
engagement of the social partners in the TWA branche to combat illegal practices, the 
social partners in the Construction industry agreed in 2006 on a so-called Compliance 
Office that would combat illegal employment and unfair competition by migrant 
workers. The aim was to actively monitor compliance of the rules by foreign 
companies and (their) workers. The Compliance Office was to become a central point 
of contact and registration for firms and employees. Moreover, the Office would 
actively search cooperation with the Labour Inspectorate and other enforcement 
authorities and with the social partners in the temporary agency sector to join forces
97against concrete illegal practices. However, in 2009 the Compliance Office was 
closed down because it had not able to achieve its goals. Part of the duties are now 
shifted to another joint office.
g) Information on applicable labour law for posted workers:
In recent years considerable progress has been made in making available the required 
information on host labour standards for posted workers and their employers. For 
instance, the Minister of Social Affairs has launched a whole website in the Polish 
language, and social partners in TWA and Construction have updated their 
information leaflets on the applicable hard core of CLA-provisions, digitalised them 
and translated them in four to six languages.
h) Media campaigns and informational events
The Labour Inspectorate has informed the public on the risk and impact of undeclared 
labour by radio emissions and newspaper articles in a media campaign in 2006. 
Regular press releases of planned actions are meant to inform the public about the 
topic and the task of the Labour Inspectorate. In the same year FNV unions initiated a 
promotion campaign and demonstration (April 2006) for ‘equal work, equal wages’ in 
the first quarter of 2006. In the construction industry the employers association 
organised several informational events in the region to inform employers on their 
obligations and to explain the benefits of declared work.
i) Liability in subcontracting and temporary agency work
96 See Sol and Schram, SMA 2007; Houwerzijl/Peters, Liability in subcontracting processes, country 
report the Netherlands, 2008; Temporary agency work in an enlarged European Union - The case of the 
Netherlands EIRO thematic feature 2006, par. 8.
97 See ‘Bureau Naleving tegen illegale arbeid in de bouw.’ Press release Bouwend Nederland 16 mei 
2006.
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From 1 January 2010, liability exists for the wages of temporary agency workers in 
user companies which make use of non-certified temporary work agencies. The 
liability is limited to the statutory minimum wage level. This new legislative measure 
is laid down in Art. 7: 692 BW and means to encourage the use of NEN-certified
98temporary work agencies. It is also applicable to users of foreign temporary work 
agencies and is thus also meant to serve as a tool to enhance compliance to the host 
labour standards by foreign service providers. The German example played a role in 
the parliamentary process where a reference to the Wolff/Mueller judgment of the 
ECJ in 2004 was made in an analysis of the compability of this measure with the 
obligations under EU law. Liability for wages is a new tool of enforcement of labour 
law in the Netherlands. It fits in the trend to further compliance without (too much) 
administrative ado. Nevertheless, liability as such is not new.
With regard to labour law, Art.7:658 (4) Civil Code provides for a liability of the user 
undertaking in the event of industrial accidents or work related diseases. And already 
since 1982 the Wages and Salaries Tax and Social Security Contributions Act 
(Liability of Subcontractors - Wet Ketenaansprakelijkheid) provides that the main 
contractor or user company is liable for social security contributions and income tax. 
The first goal of this Act is to fight unreliable subcontractors and temporary work 
agencies. The main contractor/user company is not only liable for the first 
subcontractor but for the whole chain of subcontractors who follow in line and work 
on the same project. The second goal is to combat unfair competition. However, in 
cross-border situations the Act is not always applicable: when foreign subcontractors 
are at work with posted workers, no social security contributions and income taxes are 
due for respectively the first two years and the first 183 days of labour. Foreign 
temporary work agencies however are covered by the Dutch law on wage tax from the 
first day of labour.99
4.4 Observations
Since 2005, the initial reluctance of the government to implement measures aimed at 
the practical effectiveness of the PWD, has vanished. The most important policy 
change was the expansion of the substantive scope of the Terms of employment (cross 
border worker) Act. Two important reasons behind this policy shift were the debate 
on the draft services directive in Autumn 2004 and coincidentally the necessicity to 
lift the transitional regime for (genuine) posting of workers due to case-law of the 
ECJ. With regard to the latter, the replacement of a migrant law tool of enforcement 
by a labour law enforcement tool is noteworthy.
However, if it would only have been for the effectiveness of the Terms of Conditions 
(Cross-border worker) Act, most other measures to stir the practical effectiveness of 
the PWD would probably not have been taken. Therefore, in section 4.3 the 
favourable climate for more stringent enforcement tools (policy change nr. 2) was 
sketched and a survey was given of implemented measures in the last five years. The 
main focus of all these tools and measures is on:
9S See Houwerzijl/Peters, TRA 2G1G forth coming
99 See Houwerzijl/Peters, European foundation report on liability in subcontracting processess, 2GGS, 
country report the Netherlands.
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• better enforcement of existing laws and conventions and improvement of 
control and sanctions
• more staff and resources for the labour inspectorate and other authorities or 
institutions involved
• higher efficiency in the penal or administrative procedures, sanctioning of all 
actors involved
• blacklisting of contractors and/or customers
• methods linked to the liability in the chain (main contractor and/or client 
oriented)
• improvement of the cooperation between actors concerned
• transparent and accessible information on the applicable rules
• promotional measures demonstrating the benefits of abiding by the rules for 
employers and employees.
Most of these measures are targeted (and have to be, if only because of equal 
treatment obligations) on diminishing all kinds of bogus or illegal labour relationships 
and abusive or exploitative working conditions. Since there is no registration system 
for posted workers (apart from the duty to notify ‘genuine’ postings in relation to the 
transitional regime), the seize of the phenomenon in the Netherlands is unknown. 
However, many empirical research reports point to the sharp rise of (bogus) self­
employed as a much larger trend. Often there is both a domestic interest next to the 
cross-border interest. As much intertwined are the interests with regard to their 
content: protecting the own labour market may come first but the measures also 
(genuinely) mean to protect the (posted) workers concerned. The combination of both 
aims is logical since one of the more effective measures to protect the labour 
standards of workers is to eliminate or diminish space for labour cost competition.
Summarising, the Netherlands witnessed a policy shift from targeted control on the 
entrance of posted workers through migration law tools to control measures with a 
general personal scope in labour law. Notably, these were not only of a private law 
but also of a public law character, such as the introduction of administrative fines in 
the Minimum wages law. The introduction of a user company liability for the 
Minimum wage in January 2010 was another remarkable step, in the perspective of 
the former, passive tradition with regard to enforcement in Dutch labour law. This 
policy shift was facilitated by a political climate fancying better enforcement of rules 
and combating illegal practices in general.
V. Reactions to the ‘Laval-quartet’
In comparison with the impact of the draft Services Directive and the enlargement, the 
ECJ judgments in the so-called ‘Laval-quartet’ didn’t cause much arousal. Of course 
they were (critically) scrutinized in academic literature and in the field of public 
policy, but with regard to the impact of this case-law the shared conclusion was that 
Dutch strike law, public procurement law, PIL-law and the implementation of the 
PWD, were more or less in line with the four judgments. Nevertheless, some, in 
comparison with other countries rather minor, comments can be made with regard to 
the impact of the four judgments in the Dutch context. These (and not the judgments 
themselves) will be dealt with below in chronological order.
5.1 Impact of the Viking/Laval judgments
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5.1.1 Impact on Dutch strike law or practice?
With regard to the kind of strikes that were at stake in the Viking and Laval cases, it 
must be noted that the judgments will not have any consequences, since it is highly 
unusual that Dutch unions would resort to collective action in order to compel 
outsiders to adhere to a collective agreement. Nevertheless, there may occur a more 
indirect effect of Viking/Laval, namely on the willingness of Dutch trade unions to 
strike in certain cross-border situations. In one case, this may have played a role. The 
case was as follows:
In 2008, a posting of workers case attracted attention in the press: A German cleaning 
company was subcontracted by a Dutch company to carry out cleaning activities in its 
holiday parcs located in the Netherlands and in Germany. This caught the interest of 
the media, when trade union FNV initiated actions against the subcontractor because 
of complaints about bad working conditions. Especially the difference in payment 
between German workers and their Dutch colleagues was felt as unfair. Questions 
about this case were posed in Dutch Parliament.100 In media stories the difference in 
payment was related to the fact that German workers were covered by a less 
favourable German CLA, whereas to Dutch workers the Dutch CLA was applied.101 
The company insisted that it adhered to the law and if one takes the PWD into 
consideration this may have been the case if a non extended Dutch CLA applied in 
that period. The FNV chose in this case to try to pursuade the company to reward the 
Dutch and German workers equally for their identical work, even if on pure legal 
grounds they may not have been obliged to do so. According to a representative of the 
union, if it would not have been for the judgments in the Viking and Laval cases,
FNV might have considered a (call for a) solidarity strike, but now its strategy is to
102avoid litigation as much as possible in intra-EU cross-border cases.
5.1.2 Impact on Dutch exemption policy rules?
Also with regard to the application of the Dutch system of extension of CLA on 
foreign service providers, there may have been an indirect influence of the (pending)
103Laval-case. In his contribution to a book edited by Ronmar , Van Peijpe described 
the hypothetical situation of a Laval case in the Netherlands. He examined four 
possible Laval-like scenario’s. The most realistic one was the scenario that ‘Laval’ 
would have tried to evade the applicability of Dutch extended CLA-provisions by 
submitting a request for exemption to the Minister of Social Affairs (see also section
3.4.3 above). In a scenario where the Minister would refuse this request for 
exemption, Laval could go to Court and, according to Van Peijpe:
‘Lavals’ action in Court could be successful if  he could prove that a Dutch employer under similar 
circumstances would have received an exemption. Perhaps ‘Laval’ could use as an argument for 
exemption that the special conditions of his enterprise, being established on a distant location (travel- 
and housing costs for the workers) require an exemption. Such an argument may be successful if 
‘Laval’ can find a precedent where similar conditions have been accepted as a ground for exemption
100 Menke Kamervragen 34 2008 12250 8 september 2008
101 See for instance: http://www.depers.nl/binnenland/236662/Schoonmakersprotest-in-Heiien.html; 22 
and 27 August 2009.
102 Information based an interview with a representive of FNV, who also referred to the BALPA in this 
respect.
103 T. van Peijpe, If Vaxholm were in Holland, in: Mia Ronnmar (ed), EU vs national industrial 
relations, Kluwer 2008.
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for Dutch employers. Furthermore, ‘Laval’ could put forward that he is discriminated against since it is 
difficult for a foreign service provider to meet the procedural requirements for exemption in the 
Netherlands.’104
That a refusal of an exemption from extension to a foreign service provider must be 
deemed discriminatory in a situation where a domestic employer would have received 
it, followed already from the judgment of the ECJ in 2002 in the case Portugaia 
Construcoes.105 Here, the ECJ ruled that the fact that German employers could be 
exempted from the obligation to pay minimum wages by concluding their own CLA 
whereas foreign service providers did not have this opportunity, constituted 
discrimination and a violation of Article 49 EC (now Art. 56 TFEU). Apparently, at 
that time, the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs didn’t realise that its own exemption 
policy provided an equivalent loophole as the German one.106
In the Netherlands, exemption from (extended) CLA-provisions by the Minister of 
Social Affairs is possible under certain conditions. According to the published policy
107rules in force until 1 January 2007, first of all, the employer has to conclude a, 
according to Dutch norms, legally valid CLA on enterprise/company level. Secondly, 
a request for exemption should be directed to the Minister of Social Affairs, who 
would than assess it by virtue of the policy rules. According to these rules, a request 
for an exemption used to be granted ‘in principle’ if the employer was already bound 
by another CLA. In practice, this turned out to be a loophole for competition on 
labour costs because the rules made it possible for an employer to pay lower wages if 
he concluded a CLA on enterprise/company level.108
The Ministry of Social Affairs did not investigate how many of the granted 
exemptions were given on the basis of company CLAs with a lower level than the 
industrial CLA. However, from 2002 on attempts of employers to evade extension 
were reported ever more frequently in literature. These employers asked for an 
exemption after the conclusion of a very meagre company CLA with an employer- 
friendly (‘yellow’), not really independent, union. Not surprisingly, the experience 
with lower level company CLAs grew in particular in several branches with fierce 
labour-cost-competition.109 Hence, criticism increased, in line with the frequency of 
use of this loophole in the branches that employ the most vulnerable (often migrant) 
employees. Moreover, in literature it was pointed out that foreign service providers 
had to be given equal access110 to this loophole, once they would discover it. In this
104 Van Peijpe, 2008, for this last argument referring to A.A.H. van Hoek and M.S. Houwerzijl, ‘De 
Europese werknemer en het Nederlandse arbeidsrecht’, SMA oktober 2006, jg  61, nr 10, pp. 432-453.
105 ECJ in Case C-164/99, decided in 2002.
106 See M.S. Houwerzijl, M.S. (2002). 'Case-law o f the European Court of Justice (ECJ) about the 
posting of workers'. CLR News 2002/3, p. 3-9.
107 See Toetsingskader algemeen verbindend verklaring CAO-bepalingen. First time of publishing was
1998.
108 From documents before 1998 it can be traced that in the beginning of the 1990s the Minister of 
Social Affairs deemed exemption for a Company CAO with lower wages than the extended CAO on 
industry level inconsistent with the intention of the Act on extension o f collective agreements (Wet 
AVV). Since 1998, the policy has apparently changed in a more liberal direction.
109 See E. Franssen and A.T.J.M. Jacobs in: Niklas Bruun & Jari Hellsten (eds.), Collective agreement 
and Competition in the EU, Uppsala 2001.
110 In order to obtain an exemption certain procedural requirements must be fulfilled, which may cause 
an obstacle for employers from other MS. A request for exemption must be made within a short period 
(usually three weeks) after the publication of a proposed extension. The existence of a separate
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respect a reference was made to the than pending Laval-case before the ECJ, but also 
to the older Portugaia judgment.111
Apparently the time was ready for a change, because some additional policy rules for 
exemptions entered into force on 1 January 2007. From than on, an employer (or 
employers’ organization) must prove that there are ‘serious reasons’ (for example the 
particular character of his enterprise as distinguished from other enterprises in the 
same industry) which would make it unreasonable to apply the extended CLA 
provisions in his (their) enterprise. Moreover, it must be made clear that the union 
party to the CLA is truly independent. The new rules seem to be rather effective 
(some would say too effective). In June 2007, immediately three exemptions were 
refused under the application of the new policy rules, because the employers 
(temporary works agencies) could not provide sufficient proof of serious reasons for 
an exemption.112
5.2 Impact of the Ruffert judgment regarding social clauses
In theory, the Ruffert judgment should have had the most serious implications for 
Dutch legal practice, since the Netherlands did, in 1952, ratify Convention 94 of the
113ILO on social clauses in public procurement contracts. Article 2 of this Convention 
provides that contracts for construction etc. awarded by a public authority shall 
include clauses ensuring to the workers concerned wages (including allowances), 
hours of work and other conditions of labour which are not less favourable than those 
established for work of the same character in the trade or industry concerned in the 
district where the work is carried. Thus, when tendering, the Dutch authorities have 
committed themselves to contract only on the condition that the prevailing Dutch 
labour standards are respected by (sub) contractors. Nevertheless, it is not customary 
for the authorities to put a social clause in public procurement contracts,114 as became 
clear after a request from the ILO on the practical application of the Convention in the 
Netherlands.11 Thus, the Ruffert judgment didn’t have any repercussions for public 
procurement practice. Ironically, the FNV seized the opportunity to plead for a more 
stringent application of the ratified Convention 94 as a follow-up of the Ruffert 
judgment.116 So far, the government didn’t consider this request.
5.3 Impact of the Commission /Luxembourg judgment
Last but not least, the Commission-Luxembourg judgment, didn’t have any impact on 
the Dutch posting of workers law either, since the Netherlands did not make use of the
collective agreement can be a ground for exemption only if  this separate collective agreement has been 
registered with the Minister of Social Affairs. See Art. 4 Wage Determination Act.
111 See VanHoek/Houwerzijl, De Europese werknemer en het Nederlandse arbeidsrecht, SMA 2006.
112 W.G.M. Plessen, ‘Cao-perikelen, een vervolg’, SociaalMaandbladArbeid, jg. 62, 2007, nr 10, pp.
352-355.
113 http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm.
114 See CEACR 2001/72 nd Session, ‘Comments made by the Committee o f Experts on the Application 
of Conventions and Recommendations, Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention, 1949 (No. 94), 
Netherlands (ratification 1952), via <www. ilo.org >.
115 On 12 March 2008, the ILO issued a report on the application of Convention No. 94 in which this 
was confirmed (ILO, 2008).
116 See M. Baltussen, ArbeidsRecht 2008.
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possibility laid down in Art. 3(10) (first indent) of the PWD to impose more 
mandatory rules than the ‘hard core’. Therefore, this judgment didn’t stir much 
political arousal either.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the government chose to implement the PWD in 
1999 as if it were the ‘maximum’ directive that it seems to be from 2008 on, it cannot 
be ruled out that other mandatory rules than the hard core would be applicable 
according to Dutch legal doctrine. As observed by the SER in its advice on the draft 
Services Directive, ‘The Rome Convention also remains relevant in situations that do 
come under the posting situations. The Posting of Workers Directive only stipulates 
that the mandatory law of the host country applies to the hard core of employment 
terms and working conditions. With regard to employment terms that fall outside or 
go beyond this hard core the country of origin principle could, potentially, interfere 
with the Rome Convention.’117 Thus, it remains to be seen whether in a future case an 
appeal to Art. 7 Rome Convention/Art. 9 Rome I Regulation would be honoured, 
although the margin of appreciation is certainly diminised by the ECJ judgment in 
Commission/Luxembourg.
5.4 Conclusion
With regard to the impact of the Laval-quartet in the Netherlands, we can be very 
brief: The Viking and Laval-judgments may have a discouraging effect on the 
readiness of trade-unions to call for (solidarity) strikes in cross-border situations, but 
so far this is only based on an observation, not on any real evidence (which may be 
hard to obtain). Likewise, it may be speculated, that in 2006 the than pending Laval- 
case has had some influence in the decision of the government to close a loophole in 
its exemption policy for extended CLA which heavily undermined the aim of the 
Extension of Collective Agreements provisions Act in certain labour-intensive sectors 
(often with a lot of migrant labour). Nevertheless, the policy shift predominantly aims 
to shield organised labour from domestic ‘social dumping’, since no service provider 
from another Member State had ever used the loophole in practice. Ironically, the 
Ruffert judgment didn’t have any impact in the Netherlands because in practice the 
ratified ILO Convention 94 on social clauses in public procurement contracts is not 
applied. As for the Commission/Luxembourg judgment, this judgment didn’t leave 
traces in the Netherlands because the PWD was implemented as if it a ‘maximum’ 
directive right from the beginning.
VI. Conclusive remarks
In a comparative perspective, the implementation, application and enforcement of the 
PWD in the Netherlands didn’t involve major difficulties or political turmoils. 
Nevertheless, we may conclude from the above (see for a summary of the contents of 
this paper first and foremost sections 2.3, 3.9, 4.4 and 5.4), that the Dutch ‘neutral’ 
transposal of the PWD into Dutch law and legal practice, was too minimalistic with 
regard to (1) ensuring its practical effectiveness, (2) its personal scope and (3) the 
substantive scope, by excluding extended CLA-provisions from all sectors but the 
construction industry. With regard to issue 2 nothing has been done yet (and there 
seems to be no need for in legal practice), but with regard to issues 1 and 3 two major
117 Cited from SER Advies Dienstenrichtlijn, 2005, English summary.
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changes in policy were established (see sections 4.1 and 4.3 above). The most 
important legislative change was the expansion of the substantive scope of the Terms 
of employment (cross border worker) Act in 2005 to extended hard core CLA- 
provisions in all industries. From than on, the government and social partners also 
began to work more actively than before towards improving the practical 
effectiveness of the PWD, in particular with regard to monitoring and enforcing 
compliance to the rules.
Two important reasons behind these policy shifts were the debate on the draft services 
directive in Autumn 2004 and coincidentally the necessity for the Dutch government 
to lift the transitional free movement of EU8 workers regime for (genuine) posting of 
workers due to case-law of the ECJ. With regard to the latter reason, the fact that a 
migrant law tool of enforcement was replaced by labour law enforcement tools, 
including some of a public law nature, is noteworthy. Another interesting aspect of 
the need to adapt the transitional rules on posted workers to the case law of the ECJ, is 
that it revealed the long-standing misunderstanding of the Rush Portuguesa judgment 
with respect to the non-entrance of posted workers on the labour market of the host 
state. Until today, the Dutch government sticks however to the leeway the Rush 
Portuguesa judgment gave for the interpretation that workers posted by foreign 
intermediaries do enter the Dutch labout market and therefore do not constitute 
‘genuine’ postings. A case on this aspect of the Dutch transitional regime for the free 
movement of workers is now pending before the ECJ.
On the contrary, in the beginning of the 1990s, when the Rush Portuguesa judgment 
was released, the Dutch approach was remarkably passive with regard to the 
possibility the ECJ gave to host member states to impose their mandatory labour 
standards in legislation and (extended) CLAs upon foreign service providers. One of 
the reasons behind this must have been that social dumping was not felt as a problem 
in the Netherlands. An exception was the construction industry. Here, the extended 
CLA was made applicable to posted workers from 1995 on, following the example of 
Belgium. Another, more legally informed reason for the ‘non-use’ of the Rush 
Portuguesa judgment in this respect, may be found in the Dutch Private International 
Law-tradition. The traditional Dutch PIL-approach to what constitutes a rule of an 
overriding mandatory character steers a middle-course. For a posted worker on the 
territory of the Netherlands before the implementation of the PWD, this meant that 
not all, but only some provisions of extended CLAs could be applied to him, namely 
when these provisions due to their nature and purpose should be classified as rules of 
an overriding mandatory character.
Coming from this tradition, it was only logical to implement the PWD in a ‘neutral’ 
way, furthering legal certainty as much as possible. This led to an implementation Act 
that suited the goal of ‘enhancing the free movement of services within the EU’ above 
the other goals of the PWD. So, in this Dutch context, the word ‘neutral’ may be 
coined as a synonym for ‘internal market friendly’. Together with the balanced Dutch 
PIL-tradition regarding employment contracts, which in fact stood model for Art. 7 of 
the Rome Convention, this seems to explain why the Netherlands experienced no 
aftermath of the so-called ‘Laval-quartet’, but instead proved to be a trendsetter with 
its limited interpretation of the substantive scope of the PWD.
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